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131 
PLEASE REPORT TO THE PRINCIPAL’S OFFICE, URINE 
TROUBLE: THE EFFECT OF BOARD OF EDUCATION V. 
EARLSg ON AMERICA’S SCHOOLCHILDREN 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
High school students participating in extracurricular activities will 
lose sleep stressing about a new type of exam.1  Not a traditional exam 
that tests their knowledge of math, social studies, or English, but an 
exam that tests their urine.2 
Drug abuse among high school students is a serious problem that 
school officials confront everyday.3  Instead of traditional drug 
 
g  See Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Public Sch. Dist. [Earls I], 115 F. Supp.2d 1281 
(W.D. Okla. 2000) (allowing the school district to drug test students wishing to participate in 
extracurricular activities), rev’d sub nom, Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Public Sch. Dist. No. 
92 of Pottawatomie County [Earls II], 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding it unconstitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment to require students wishing to participate in extracurricular activities 
to submit to suspicionless drug test), rev’d sub nom, Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of 
Pottawatomie County v. Earls [Earls III], 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (holding public high school policy of 
suspicionless drug testing of students participating in extracurricular activities was reasonable and 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 1. See Too Much Tossing and Turning?, THE SUN HERALD, July30, 2002, available at 
http://www.sunherald.com/mld/sunherald/living/3761385.htm (discussing how teenage students do 
not get enough sleep on the typical school night).  Studies show that most teens need about nine 
hours a sleep a night, but more than 25% of teens sleep fewer than seven hours.  Id. 
 2. See Earls III, 536 U.S. at 837 (allowing school district to drug test students participating 
in extracurricular activities at any time during students’ involvement). 
 3. See Dept. of Health and Human Services, Monitoring the Future: National Results on 
Adolescent Drug Use, Overview of Key Findings (2001) (discussing statistics of drug use among 
American children).  The number of seniors in high school using any illicit drug increased from 
48.4% in 1995 to 53.9% in 2001.  Id.  The number of high school seniors reporting they used 
marijuana increased from 41.7% to 49% in that same six year span.  Id.  In 1998, studies revealed 
26% of twelfth-graders reported using illicit drugs within the last thirty days, and 22% of tenth-
graders and 12% of eighth-graders reported the same.  FEDERAL INTERAGENCY FORUM ON CHILD 
AND FAMILY STATISTICS, AMERICAS CHILDREN: KEY NATIONAL INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING 
(1999), available at http://www.childstats.gov/ac1999/ac99.asp (the most recent findings of the 
FIFCFS are available at http://www.childstats.gov/).  About 34% of school children between the 
ages of eleven and fifteen say they have been offered drugs.  David Brindle, Society: Tempting Fate, 
GUARDIAN, Aug. 2, 2000, at 5. Among youths aged 12 or 13, the rate of past month illicit drug use 
increased from 3% in 2000 to 3.8% in 2001.  See SAMHSA’S NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE & 
HEALTH 2001, available at http://www.samhsa.gov/oas/nhsda.htm#NHSDAinfo (listing the most 
recent information on the prevalence, patterns, and consequences of alcohol, tobacco, and illegal 
1
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awareness programs, school officials, following the lead of the Supreme 
Court, are dealing with the drug problem by trampling on high school 
students’ Fourth Amendment rights by requiring them to submit to 
random, suspicionless4 drug tests.5 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects 
the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”6  The Fourth 
Amendment generally requires a warrant or existence of probable cause 
for a search and seizure to pass constitutional muster.7  However, using 
an analytical creation known as the “special needs” doctrine,8 the 
 
drug use and abuse in the general U.S. civilian non institutionalized population, age 12 and older). 
 4. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1890 (3d ed. 1986) (defining 
suspicionless as “having or showing no suspicion”).  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1460 (7th ed 
1999) (defining suspicion as “[t]he imagination or apprehension of the existence of something 
wrong based only on slight or no evidence, without definitive proof”). 
 5. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (holding the school district’s 
suspicionless drug testing program of student athletes was reasonable and, therefore, constitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment); Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 
2000) (affirming the school district’s policy requiring all students who wanted to participate in 
extracurricular activities or who wished to drive to school to submit to drug testing); Miller ex rel. 
Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574 (8th  Cir. 1999) (upholding a school district’s suspicionless drug 
testing policy of all students in grades seven through twelve wanting to participate in extracurricular 
activities);Todd v. Rush County Schs., 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the school 
district’s suspicionless drug testing policy requiring all students participating in extracurricular 
activities to be tested was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment).  But see Brooks v. East 
Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding random drug testing of 
students wishing to participate in extracurricular activities was unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Id. 
 7. Id.  See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (stating a 
search and seizure is not reasonable unless it is accomplished using a judicial warrant issued upon 
probable cause); Payton v. N.Y., 445 U.S. 573, 584-87 (1980) (discussing that two requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment, probable cause and warrant, were established by the founders of the 
Constitution to prevent the evils of unreasonable searches and seizures); Nancy D. Wagman, 
Casenote, Are We Becoming a Society of Suspects? Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton: Examining 
Random, Suspicionless Drug Testing of Public School Athletes, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 325, 
353 (“The Supreme Court’s determination that a drug test conducted in a public school system 
without suspicion of any wrongdoing is reasonable and thus constitutional ignored the long standing 
history of the Fourth Amendment and the elements which are traditionally required for a search to 
be reasonable.”). 
 8. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989) (defining a 
special need as a need of the government to discover a latent or hidden condition, or prevent the 
development of a hidden condition, which can only be accomplished by conducting a search without 
individualized suspicion); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (stating that a special need is a need, “beyond 
2
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Supreme Court has been able to sidestep traditional Fourth Amendment 
requirements such as warrants, probable cause, and individualized 
suspicion.9  Instead of complying with these requirements, the Court 
balances the compelling interests of the government against the privacy 
of the individual to determine if the search is constitutional.10 
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court used the “special needs” 
doctrine to eliminate additional constitutional protections from 
schoolchildren, as previously guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.11  
In Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of 
Pottawatomie County v. Earls,12 Lindsey Earls, a student in 
Pottawatomie school district, challenged the constitutionality, under the 
Fourth Amendment, of the school district’s policy requiring all students 
wishing to participate in extracurricular activities to submit to random 
 
the normal need of law enforcement,” that causes the warrant and probable cause requirements to 
become impracticable); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1404 (7th ed 1999) (defining the special-needs 
analysis as “[a] balancing test used by the Supreme Court to determine whether certain searches 
(such as administrative, civil-based, or public-safety searches) impose unreasonably on individual 
rights”). 
 9. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313-14 (1997) (discussing how the Supreme Court has 
in limited circumstances made exceptions to requirements of the Fourth Amendment); Griffin v. 
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (stating that the Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to 
the Fourth Amendment “when ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make 
the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable’”); Skinner, 489 U.S at 619 (discussing 
Griffin); Jennifer L. Malin, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton: A Further Erosion of the Fourth 
Amendment, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 469, 490 (1996) (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s erosion due 
to the Supreme Courts expanding special needs exception). 
 10. Earls III, 536 U.S. at 838 (holding suspicionless drug testing of students involved in 
extracurricular activities was constitutional based in part on government’s interest to deter drug use 
among schoolchildren); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661 (holding suspicionless drug test of student 
athletes was constitutional based in part on government’s interest to deter drug use among 
schoolchildren); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628 (holding suspicionless drug test of railroad workers was 
constitutional based on compelling government interest in having workers operating dangerous 
equipment free from influence of drugs in order to reduce risk of injuries to others); Nat’l Treasury, 
489 U.S. at 671-72 (holding suspicionless drug test of custom service agents applying for 
promotions was constitutional based in part on compelling government interest in safeguarding the 
nations borders and keeping people who carry firearms off the influence of drugs).  But see 
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319 (holding that drug testing of candidates running for political office was 
unconstitutional based in part on the government not having a compelling interest in keeping 
political candidates free from influence of drugs). 
 11. See Earls III, 536 U.S. at 838 (holding public high school policy of suspicionless drug 
testing of students participating in extracurricular activities was reasonable and did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment); Ian Messerle, Note, Trinidad School Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez: The Fourth 
Amendment, Random Drug Testing, and the High School Marching Band, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 819, 
839-41 (2000) (discussing how expanding suspicionless drug testing to all students participating in 
an extracurricular activity would present unfair choice between waiver of the Fourth Amendment 
right against unreasonable search and seizures and refusing to participate in extracurricular 
activities). 
 12. 536 U.S at 826-27. 
3
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drug testing.13  The Supreme Court held that the school district’s policy 
was constitutional and did not violate the Fourth Amendment because 
“special needs” exist in the public school setting that make the warrant 
and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment 
impracticable.14  Therefore, the Court concluded because the 
government’s interest in preventing drug use among schoolchildren 
outweighed the children’s Fourth Amendment rights, the search was 
reasonable and not in violation of the Fourth Amendment.15 
This Note analyzes the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Board of 
Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie 
County v. Earls and its implication for the future of the Fourth 
Amendment and drug testing.16  Part II of this Note documents the 
history and the expansion of the “special needs” doctrine, and illustrates 
how the doctrine has whittled away high school and middle school 
students’ Fourth Amendment guarantees.17  Part III of this Note 
introduces the parties and gives a picture of the circumstances 
surrounding the Earls case.18  Part III then discusses the District Court 
 
 13. Id. at 827 (arguing that random drug testing of students who are not involved in athletic 
related extracurricular activities constituted an unreasonable search or seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment, and can be distinguished from the earlier holding in Vernonia).  Plaintiffs argue 
specifically that the search should be based on some individualized suspicion.  Id. at 829.  The 
plaintiffs do not argue that the school district needs probable cause before drug testing students 
because the school district’s policy is not related in any way to criminal investigations.  Id. 
 14. Id. at 829-30 (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653 and New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
339-40 (1985)).  The Supreme Court “allowed the Tecumseh, Oklahoma School District to conduct 
testing of students as a means of preventing and deterring drug use.”  Alison Knopf, Drugs in the 
Workplace, XVI NO. 9 DRUGS IN WORKPLACE 7 (2002).  The Supreme Court “held that a public 
school policy requiring all students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities to 
submit to drug testing did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable 
searches.”  Alexander C. Black, Annotation, Search Conducted By School Official or Teacher as 
Violation of Fourth Amendment or Equivalent State Constitutional Provision, 31 A.L.R.5th 229, 
§16.5 (2002). “The policy reasonably served the school district’s important interest in detecting and 
preventing drug use among its students.”  Id. 
 15. Earls III, 536 U.S. at 838.  See Black, supra note 14, at § 16.5 (stating the nationwide 
drug problem among school children makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in every 
school).  The Court has already articulated in detail the importance of the government’s concern of 
keeping students off drugs in Vernonia.  Id. The health and safety risks the Court identified in 
Vernonia, apply to the students in the Tecumseh school district which justify suspicionless drug 
testing of students. Id. 
 16. Earls III, 536 U.S. at 822-855.  See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text. 
 17. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; infra notes 22-50 and accompanying text.  See Malin, supra 
note 9, at 490 (discussing how the Fourth Amendment is being eroded due to the Supreme Court’s 
expanding special needs exception); Robert D. Dodson, Ten Years of Randomized Jurisprudence: 
Amending the Special Needs Doctrine, 51 S.C. L. REV. 258, 276-77 (2000) (claiming special needs 
balancing test has become little more than a judicial rubber stamp for approval of suspicionless drug 
tests). 
 18. See infra notes 51-101 and accompanying text. 
4
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for the Western District of Oklahoma, the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, and Supreme Court decisions in this significant case.19  
Part IV scrutinizes the Supreme Court’s application of the “special 
needs” doctrine in allowing public schools to drug test students wishing 
to participate in extracurricular activities.20  Lastly, Part V of this Note 
suggests possible consequences of the Supreme Court’s decision and the 
potential dangerous effect it will have on Fourth Amendment rights.21 
II.  BACKGROUND 
In Earls, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Pottawatomie 
School District violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution by requiring all students participating in extracurricular 
activities to submit to suspicionless drug tests.22  A discussion of the 
Fourth Amendment and the evolution of the “special needs” doctrine are 
necessary to understand the Court’s reasoning and eventual ruling.23 
A.  The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable 
searches and seizures of their person, houses, papers, and possessions.24  
An important objective of the Amendment is to protect the legitimate 
 
 19. See infra Part III; Earls I, 115 F.Supp.2d 1281 (W.D. Okla. 2000); Earls II, 242 F.3d 
1264 (10th Cir. 2001); Earls III, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
 20. See infra notes 102-159 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 160-167 and accompanying text. 
 22. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Earls III, 536 U.S. at 822. 
 23. See Shannon O’Pry, Comment, A Constitutional Mosh Pit: Fourth Amendment, 
Suspicionless Searches, and the Toughest Public School Drug Testing Policy in America, 33 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 151, 158-59 (2001) (discussing how the Fourth Amendment was created from 
colonists’ dislike and fear of general searches in England that gave the King authority to enter 
merchants’ property at anytime); Peter A. Veytsman, Comment, Drug Testing Student Athletes and 
Fourth Amendment Privacy: The Legal Aftermath of Vernonia v. Acton, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 295, 297 
(2000) (discussing how the Framers of the Constitution drafted the Fourth Amendment in response 
to abuses by British soldiers using writs of assistance to conduct unnecessary searches). 
 24. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or 
seizure by a private party.  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989).  The 
Amendment only protects against intrusions by a private party acting as an agent of the 
Government.  Id. (citing U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984)).  Whether a private party 
should be labeled an agent or instrument of the government under the Fourth Amendment turns on 
the amount of government involvement in the private party’s actions.  Id.  Although the Fourth 
Amendment was believed for a long time only to apply to searches conducted by law enforcement 
officers, the Supreme Court expanded the Amendment to include searches by civil government 
authorities, as well.  Joanna Raby, Note, Reclaiming Our Public Schools: A Proposal for School-
Wide Drug Testing, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 999, 1004 (1999).  Searches by civil government 
authorities have been termed “administrative” searches.  Id. 
5
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expectations of privacy, dignity, and security of persons, in places where 
one has the right to be alone.25  Traditionally, a Fourth Amendment 
search is deemed reasonable only if it is conducted pursuant to a warrant 
and based on probable cause.26  However, the Supreme Court has carved 
out a limited number of exceptions to the general rule, which allow 
searches in the absence of either a warrant or probable cause.27  One of 
the exceptions that has been applied to searches conducted in public 
schools is the “special needs” doctrine.28 
 
 25. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (citing Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 
436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978) and quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)). The 
Fourth Amendment imposes standards against government officials “in order to safeguard the 
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.”  Id.  “An important objective of the 
amendment is to protect expectations of privacy—the individual’s legitimate expectations that in 
certain places and at certain times he has the right to be left alone—the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”  Wagman, supra note 7, at *3 (citing Winston v. 
Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985)).  The Fourth Amendment is a safeguard for the privacy and security 
of individuals and gives a concrete expression to the rights of the people which are “basic to a free 
society.”  Raby, supra note 24, at 1002-03. 
 26. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (emphasizing that “the Fourth 
Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes, and that searches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment”); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 86 (2001) (declaring that 
official nonconsensual search not authorized by valid warrant is unconstitutional).  See Loree L. 
French, Note, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association and the Fourth Amendment 
Warrant-Probable Cause Requirement: Special Needs Exception Creating a Shakedown 
Inspection?, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 117, 123 (1990) (stating that Fourth Amendment searches would 
traditionally only be reasonable upon issuance of warrant based on probable cause); David Badanes, 
Comment, Earls v. Board of Education: A Timid Attempt To Limit Special Needs From Becoming 
Nothing Special, 75 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 693, 695 (2001) (discussing how in the past the Supreme 
Court followed a general rule that nonconsensual searches are unconstitutional if not authorized by 
a valid warrant or individualized suspicion). 
 27. See, e.g., Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (upholding police 
roadblocks to check the sobriety of drivers); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634 (holding drug testing of 
railroad workers did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Nat’l Treasury, 489 U.S. at 679 (holding 
suspicionless drug test of custom service agents applying for promotions was constitutional); United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976) (holding temporary detainment at permanent 
border patrol checkpoints for questioning of motorists about citizenship and immigration status was 
constitutional).  See Wagman, supra note 7, at 332-33 (summarizing exceptions to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment). 
 28. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985) (holding that special needs exist 
in public schools allowing school officials to suspend traditional Fourth Amendment requirements); 
Malin, supra note 9, at 473 (“The Supreme Court uses the ‘special needs’ exception  to uphold 
searches that are not based on individualized suspicion.”); Roseann Kitson, Note, High School 
Students, You’re in Trouble: How the Seventh Circuit Has Expanded the Scope of Permissible 
Suspicionless Searches in Public Schools, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 851, 856 (discussing how the 
Supreme Court has upheld searches not meeting the two requirements of the Fourth Amendment 
when special needs exist). 
6
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B.  The Fourth Amendment and its Application to Searches in Public 
Schools 
New Jersey v. T.L.O. marked the first time the Supreme Court 
attempted to reconcile the privacy rights of students against the 
government’s interest in maintaining an environment conducive to 
learning.29  In T.L.O., the Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applied 
to searches conducted by public school officials.30  However, the Court 
went on to state that even though the Fourth Amendment does apply in 
the school context, the legality of searches by school officials should be 
assessed against a standard lower than that of probable cause because 
schools have a “special need” to maintain control in the classroom.31  
The Court concluded that the level of reasonableness is one that stops 
short of probable cause and that school officials do not need to obtain a 
warrant.32  To determine the level of reasonableness of school searches, 
 
 29. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325.  See Linda Oshman, Comment, Public School Lessons: Setting 
Limits on Suspicionless Drug Testing After Vernonia, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1313, 1318 (2001) (stating 
how the Supreme Court attempted to strike a balance between students’ expectations of privacy at 
school and schools’ interest in a strong learning environment). 
 30. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333.  It has been held that school officials are state actors when it 
comes to not being able to deprive students of their constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
expression under the First Amendment, so therefore it does not make sense that school officials 
would not be considered state actors when conducting searches of students.  Id. at 336.  “In carrying 
out searches and other disciplinary functions, school officials act as representatives of the State, not 
merely as surrogates of parents,” being able to claim immunity from the Fourth Amendment 
requirements.  Id. 
 31. Id. at 340 (recognizing that the school setting requires easing of the Fourth Amendment 
restrictions that government agents are required to follow); Michael Book, Group Suspicion: The 
Key to Evaluating Student Drug Testing, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 637, 643 (2000) (stating how the 
Supreme Court discussed the special needs of public school officials in maintaining order and 
discipline is important to justify relaxing the Fourth Amendment requirements).  But see J. Bates 
McIntyre, Note, Empowering Schools to Search: The Effect of Growing Drug and Violence 
Concerns on American Schools, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025, 1049 (2000) (discussing how 
suspicionless drug testing may not create an environment conducive to learning, but teachs students 
that order and discipline is more important than individual constitutionally protected rights). 
 32. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (stating in particular that the warrant requirement is deficient in 
the school setting because school officials need to take fast disciplinary action).  Forcing teachers or 
other school officials to obtain a warrant before searching a student suspected of violating school 
rules would frustrate the purpose behind the search.  Id.  The need of teachers to maintain order in 
school does not require strict adherence to requirement of probable cause.  Id. at 341.  The legality 
of a search of students should depend on reasonableness and not traditional standards of probable 
cause.  Id.  “Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the 
public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of 
probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard.”  Id. at 341.  “By focusing attention 
on the question of reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers and school administrators the 
7
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the students’ legitimate expectations of privacy must be balanced against 
the government’s need for having an effective method to maintain an 
environment conducive to learning.33  Consequently, reasonable 
suspicion replaced probable cause as the level of evidence necessary to 
pass constitutional muster, and opened the door to suspicionless searches 
in schools.34 
C.  Expansion of the Special Needs Doctrine: Suspicionless Drug 
Testing of Student Athletes 
In T.L.O., the Supreme Court left unanswered the question of 
whether individualized suspicion was an indispensable element of the 
reasonableness standard required for searches conducted by school 
officials.35  However, the Supreme Court wrestled with this question in 
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, and held that random drug testing 
of student athletes did not violate the Fourth Amendment.36  The 
 
necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause. . . .”  Id. at 343.  The court 
created the special needs doctrine because the traditional Fourth Amendment requirements are not 
well suited for searches in a school setting when trying to discipline students.  Ross H. Parr, Note, 
Suspicionless Drug Testing and Chandler v. Miller: Is the Supreme Court Making the Right 
Decisions?, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 241, 246-47 (1998). 
 33. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (stating in particular that the warrant requirement is deficient in 
the school setting because school officials need to take fast disciplinary action).  Forcing teachers or 
other school officials to obtain a warrant before searching a student suspected of violating school 
rules would frustrate the purpose behind the search.  Id.  The need of teachers to maintain order in 
school does not require strict adherence to requirement of probable cause.  Id. at 341.  The legality 
of a search of students should depend on reasonableness and not traditional standards of probable 
cause.  Id.  “Where a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the 
public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of 
probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard.”  Id. at 341.  “By focusing attention 
on the question of reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers and school administrators the 
necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause. . . .”  Id. at 343.  The court 
created the special needs doctrine because the traditional Fourth Amendment requirements are not 
well suited for searches in a school setting when trying to discipline students.  Ross H. Parr, Note, 
Suspicionless Drug Testing and Chandler v. Miller: Is the Supreme Court Making the Right 
Decisions?, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 241, 246-47 (1998). 
 34. Id. at 354 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining how a reasonableness standard is not the 
same test as the probable cause standard found in Fourth Amendment).  Oshman, supra note 29, at 
1318 (stating the level of evidence necessary to conduct a search in the public school setting 
changed from probable cause to reasonable suspicion).  The decision in T.L.O. opened the door for 
suspicionless school searches.  Id. 
 35. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342, n.8 (“We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an 
essential element of the reasonableness standard we adopt for searches by school authorities.”); 
Neal H. Hutchens, Commentary, Suspicionless Drug Testing: The Tuition for Attending Public 
School, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1265, 1269 (2002) (stating the Supreme Court did not answer whether 
school searches conducted without individualized suspicion would not violate the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 36. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995).  See Anne Proffit Dupre, 
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Supreme Court relied on its reasoning in T.L.O., where it held “special 
needs” exist in the public school context, which call for a narrowing of 
the Fourth Amendment requirements.37  The Court noted that the T.L.O. 
decision was based on individualized suspicion, but reconciled this 
difference by pointing to cases where suspicionless searches involving 
drug tests were held constitutional.38 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court used a balancing test as a guide in 
determining whether searches conducted by school officials, 
notwithstanding a lack of individualized suspicion, were reasonable.39  
The Court stated that reasonableness should be assessed by balancing the 
strength of the student’s privacy interest guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment against legitimate governmental interest in conducting the 
search.40  The factors the Supreme Court used to measure the strength of 
the student’s privacy interest were: (1) the nature of the privacy interest 
upon which the search intrudes, and (2) the character of the complained 
 
Should Students Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 49, 57 (1996) (discussing how the Supreme Court failed to decide a question that it would 
later deal with in Acton: whether individualized suspicion was necessary for a school search). 
 37. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653 (emphasizing that the Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
found special needs exist in the public school context that make the warrant and probable cause 
requirements impracticable meeting the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment).  
Mandating school officials to meet the warrant requirement would “unduly interfere with the 
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures that are needed” in the school 
context.  Id.  Strict adherence to Fourth Amendment requirement that all searches be based on 
probable cause would make ineffective the need of school officials to have the power to maintain 
order at school.  Id.  See Jon Eskelsen, Note, How Random and Suspicionless May School Searches 
Be?: Doubting Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation, 2001 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. J. 343, 
348 (2001) (explaining how Vernonia continued where T.L.O. left off by applying “special needs” 
that exist in school context to random drug testing of student athletes); Jennifer E. Smiley, Note, 
Rethinking the “Special Needs” Doctrine: Suspicionless Drug Testing of High School Students and 
the Narrowing of Fourth Amendment Protections, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 811, 821-22 (2001) (stating 
the Supreme Court referred to its decision in T.L.O. and “made a blanket determination” that a 
special need existed in public schools and focused its analysis on whether the Vernonia policy met 
the reasonableness standard and the Fourth Amendment). 
 38. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653 (explaining how even though the search approved in T.L.O. 
was based on individualized suspicion, the Court made a point in T.L.O. to acknowledge the Fourth 
Amendment “imposes no irreducible requirement of individualized suspicion”).  The Court went on 
to note it has upheld suspicionless searches and seizure to conduct drug tests of railroad workers, in 
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602, and random drug testing of federal customs agents who carry guns or are 
involved in preventing drug trafficking, in Nat’l Treasury, 489 U.S. at 656.  Id. 
 39. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-53 (discussing that in a case where no standard exists either 
approving or disapproving the type of search involved reasonableness is measured by using a 
balancing test). 
 40. Id.  Justice Scalia stated that “whether a particular search meets the reasonableness 
standard is ‘judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests 
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” Id. (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; 
quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654). 
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of intrusion.41  The Court stated that since the nature of school officials’ 
power over students is “custodial and tutelary,” students have a lesser 
expectation of privacy while at school.42  These legitimate privacy 
expectations are even smaller for athletes because there is “an element of 
communal undress inherent in athletic participation.”43  The Court then 
reasoned that since the drug testing procedures presented conditions 
“nearly identical to those typically encountered in public restrooms,” the 
nature of the intrusion was negligible.44 
 
 41. Id. at 654-660.  See Denise E. Joubert, Note, Message in a Bottle: The United States 
Supreme Court Decision in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 56 LA. L. REV. 959, 973 (1996) 
(discussing how the Court elucidated two factors to look at to determine the impact of the search on 
the students’ privacy expectations).  The first factor is the scope of the student’s expectation of 
privacy or the nature of the interest on which the search intrudes, and the second factor is the 
character of the intrusion.  Id. at 974.  See Sherri L. Toussaint, Note, Something is Terribly Wrong 
Here: Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995), 75 NEB. L. REV. 151, 156 
(1996) (stating, “[t]he factors the Supreme Court evaluated in weighing the students’ Fourth 
Amendment interests included the students’ expectations of privacy and the character of the 
intrusion itself”). 
 42. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655-57 (discussing why students in general have lesser 
expectations of privacy).  School officials stand in loco parentis over children while at school and 
hold a portion of the power of the child’s parent.  Id. at 655.  Even though the State’s power over 
students is not equal to that of a parent, the nature of the power is higher than that which could be 
exercised over adults.  Id. (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339).  See also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986) (discussing that, for limited purposes, school officials act in loco 
parentis); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (stating that 
even though students do not “shed their constitutional rights. . .at the school house gate,” the extent 
of their rights is only what is appropriate for children at school); Laurence D. Houlgate, Three 
Concepts of Children’s Constitutional Rights: Reflections on the Enjoyment Theory, 2 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 77, 85 (1999) (discussing three interpretations of children’s constitutional rights given 
the fact that children are always under the control of either their parents or the State).  The Supreme 
Court has been struggling with the dilemma of whether children are considered persons with 
fundamental rights that the State must respect, or if they to be regarded as human beings who are 
always in some form of custody.  Id. at 80.  A useful approach to help solve this dilemma is to 
distinguish between having a right and enjoying that right, because a person may have a 
constitutional right but the enjoyment of that right might be postponed comparable to a future 
interest in property law.  Id. at 85. 
 43. See Vernonia, 515 U.S at 657 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  Student athletes 
in particular have a lesser expectation of privacy compared to the student population in general.  Id.  
The majority opinion stated, “[s]chool sports are not for the bashful,” and require “suiting up before 
each practice or event, and showering and changing afterwards.”  Id.  Public school locker rooms 
where the suiting up and showering occur do not afford much privacy.  Id.  By going out for the 
team, athletes reduce their expectation of privacy because they are subjected to more regulations 
than the average student.  Id.  This reasoning is comparable to the reasoning in Skinner where adults 
who choose to work in a closely regulated profession should expect intrusions into normal rights.  
Id. 
 44. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.  Collecting a urine sample intrudes into an excretory function 
that is generally regarded as highly private.  Id. (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626).  However, the 
degree of the intrusion depends on the way in which the urine sample is monitored while being 
produced.  Id.  See Jason J. Bach, Students Without Rights: The Elimination of Constitutional and 
10
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The factors the Supreme Court used to measure the strength of the 
governments interest in conducting the search were: (1) the nature of the 
governmental concern at issue, and (2) the immediacy of the 
government’s concern.45  The Court stated that the nature of the concern 
had to be “important enough” to justify a suspicionless search, and found 
that deterring drug use by our nation’s schoolchildren is undoubtedly 
important enough.46  Finally, in analyzing the immediacy of the concern, 
the Court noted that drug abuse was escalating in the school district and 
the drug problem was largely “fueled by” the role model status of 
student athletes who used drugs.47 
 
Civil Rights, as they Apply to Minors, 1 NEV. LAW. 19, 22 (stating that he personally has never 
forgotten the strip search he was subjected to while he was in high school, so he can relate to how 
humiliating a drug test is for students); Badanes, supra note 26, at 715 (discussing how forcing 
students to urinate on demand for a drug test causes student to suffer from stress).  Ordinarily 
students urinate because their body tells them to, not because a school districts policy insists the 
student do so on demand.  Id. at 716.  See Katharine J.M. Chester, Note, Is Random Suspicionless 
Drug Testing in the Schools Reasonable? An Analysis of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 22 
N.C. CENT. L.J. 230, 241-247 (1996) (discussing how urination is intensely private to individuals 
and how schools can perform their important tasks within the boundaries of the Fourth 
Amendment); Amanda L. Harrison, Comment, Urinating on the Pennsylvania Constitution? Drug 
Testing of High School Athletes and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, 104 DICK. 
L. REV. 379, 403 (2000) (discussing how compulsive urinalysis has been recognized as a very 
invasive procedure). 
 45. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660-64 (stating that the final factor to be evaluated is the nature 
and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue in the case); Eskelsen, supra note 37, at 348 
(discussing how the Court articulated the factors to be used when evaluating the governments 
interest is the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern). 
 46. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661 (discussing how deterring drug use among students is at least, 
if not more, important than the government’s concern in other cases where suspicionless drug 
testing was upheld).  Schools where drug use is prevalent not only have a negative impact on the 
users, but on the entire student body and faculty because the educational process is disrupted.  Id. at 
662.  Drugs present a substantial physical risk to athletes in particular; . . . marijuana, for example, 
causes “reduction in the oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood,” and “inhibition of the normal 
sweating responses resulting in increased body temperature.”  Id. (citing Hawkins, Drugs and Other 
Ingesta: Effects on Athletic Performance, in H. Appenzeller, Managing Sports and Risk 
Management Strategies 90, 94 (1993)).  See also Richard A. Hawley, The Bumpy Road to Drug-
Free Schools, 72 PHI DELTA KAPPA 310, 314 (1990) (discussing dangerous effects drugs can have 
on children).  School years are the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of 
drugs are most severe.  Id.  See also Todd W. Estroff, et al., Adolescent Cocaine Abuse: Addictive 
Potential Behavioral, and Psychiatric Effects, 28 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 550 (1989) (discussing 
effects that drugs can have on adolescents); Denise B. Kandel, et al., The Consequences in Young 
Adulthood of Adolescent Drug Involvement, 43 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 746 (1986) (discussing 
effects that drugs can have on adolescents). 
 47. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663 (discussing how drug use among the students was increasing 
because the student body looked up to student athletes who were drug abusers themselves).  The 
immediacy of the concern is of greater magnitude than existed in Skinner, where the government’s 
drug testing program of railroad workers was upheld.  Id.; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602.  But see Dante 
Marrazzo, Athletes and Drug Testing: Why Do We Care If Athletes Inhale?, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 
75, 87-89 (discussing whether a person’s status as an athlete should subject him/her to greater 
11
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The Court, taking into account all the factors above, concluded that 
Vernonia’s suspicionless drug testing policy was reasonable and hence 
constitutional.48  However, the Court warned against the assumption that 
suspicionless drug testing will be held constitutional in other cases, and 
emphasized the most significant element weighing in the decision of the 
case was the government’s responsibilities as a guardian and tutor of the 
children.49  This warning set the stage for school districts across America 
to stretch the ruling in Vernonia to its limits, and became the topic of 
litigation in Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of 
Pottawatomie County v. Earls.50 
 
scrutiny for drug use). 
 48. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65 (stating, “[t]aking into account all the factors we have 
considered–the decreased expectation of privacy, the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and the 
severity of the need met by the search–we conclude Vernonia’s policy is reasonable and hence 
constitutional[]”). 
 49. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665 (cautioning against the assumption that all suspicionless drug 
testing will pass “constitutional muster”).  When the government acts as a guardian and tutor in the 
school context, the relevant question is whether the intrusion complained of is one “that a 
reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake.”  Id.  The question in the employment arena is 
whether the invasion into privacy is one in which a reasonable employer might engage.  Id. 
 50. Earls III, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).  See Cobby A. Caputo, Public Schools and Drug Testing: 
What’s Next?, 18 TEX. LAW. 24 (August 19, 2002) (discussing how after Vernonia, many school 
districts implemented suspicionless drug testing of all students, and the expansion led to the most 
recent constitutional challenges).  Some school districts have implemented policies that encompass 
students in non-athletic extracurricular activities, while other schools have strictly followed the 
ruling in Vernonia.  Oshman, supra note 29, at 1341 (discussing how the ruling in Vernonia has 
allowed lower courts and school districts to “adopt a broadstroke reading” of the Supreme Court’s 
holding).  The state of affairs after the Supreme Court’s decision demands clarification because 
lower courts have engaged in a case-by-case determination of which students can be randomly 
tested under the Vernonia standard.  Id. After the decision in Vernonia, schools have undertaken 
programs that spread beyond athletes to include all students wishing to participate in extracurricular 
activities.  Amanda E. Bishop, Note, Students, Urinalysis & Extracurricular Activities: How 
Vernonia’s Aftermath is Trampling Fourth Amendment Rights, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 217, 218 (2000) 
(discussing drug testing programs implemented after Vernonia).  After Vernonia, the question 
became what else schools can do under the Supreme Courts holding.  Id.  See Nathan Roberts & 
Richard Fossey, Random Drug Testing of Students: Where Will the Line be Drawn?, 31 J.L. & 
EDUC. 191 (analyzing post Vernonia decisions that are in conflict regarding if student drug testing 
policies that go beyond testing student athletes are constitutional under the Vernonia standards); 
Kimberly Menashe Glassman, Comment, Shedding Their Rights: The Fourth Amendment and 
Suspicionless Drug Testing of Public School Students Participating in Extracurricular Activities, 51 
CATH. U. L. REV. 951, 963-66 (2002) (analyzing court decisions that have interpreted Vernonia to 
allow suspicionless drug testing beyond athletes). 
12
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III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Statement of the Facts 
On September 14, 1998, the Tecumseh Public School District 
adopted a Student Activities Drug Testing Policy (“Policy”).51  The 
Policy required all high school and middle school students who 
participated in extracurricular activities to submit to suspicionless drug 
testing.52  Each student wishing to participate in any extracurricular 
activity was required to sign a written consent agreeing to submit to 
random drug testing prior to participating in the extracurricular activity, 
to submit to random drug testing while participating in that activity, and 
to agree to be tested at any time while participating upon reasonable 
suspicion.53  The urinalysis tests were designed to detect only illegal 
drugs.54 
The actual testing process is as follows: (1) students to be tested are 
called out in groups of two or three students, (2) the students go to the 
restroom and a faculty monitor waits outside the closed stall door while 
the student produces his/her urine sample, and (3) the student signs a 
form which is placed in a mailing pouch together with the filled urine 
vials.55 
 
 51. Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of Tecumseh Public Sch. Dist. [Earls I], 115 F. Supp.2d 1281, 1282  
(W.D. Okla. 2000).  The Board of Education of Tecumseh School District and Tecumseh Public 
Schools, operate the school and are in charge of establishing and implementing policies.  Id. 
 52. Id.  The Policy as originally proposed extended to only students participating in athletic 
competition, but was then expanded to cover all extracurricular activities.  Id. at 1283, n.2.  In 
practice the Policy has only been applied to competitive extracurricular activities sanctioned by the 
Oklahoma Secondary Schools Activities Association.  Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of 
Pottawatomie County v. Earls [Earls III], 536 U.S. 823, 826 (2002).  These competitive 
extracurricular activities include the Academic Team, Future Farmers of America, Future 
Homemakers of America, band, choir, pom-pom, cheerleading, and athletics.  Id. 
 53. Earls I, 115 F. Supp.2d at 1283.  The students and their families are charged an annual fee 
of four dollars for participation in the drug testing program.  Id.  The defendants allege that the four-
dollar fee would be waived for students who could not afford it. Earls I, 115 F. Supp.2d at 1283, 
n.4.  The vast majority of students in the school district participate in one or more school sponsored 
activity.  Id. at 1282. 
 54. Earls III, 536 U.S. at 826.  The illegal drugs tested for include amphetamines, marijuana, 
cocaine, opiates, and barbiturates.  Id.  The urinalysis tests were not supposed to test for medical 
conditions or the presence of authorized medical prescriptions.  Id.  Upon reasonable suspicion, 
students may be tested for other substances the policy identifies, such as alcohol and anabolic 
steroids.  Earls I, 115 F. Supp.2d at 1283, n.3. 
 55. Earls I, 115 F. Supp.2d at 1291, n.35.  The Policy stated the urine specimen should be 
collected in a restroom or other private bathroom facility behind a closed stall.  Id.  The principal or 
athletic director designates a school official of the same sex as the student to accompany the student 
to the stall, and observe the student while the specimen is being produced.  Id.  The monitor stands 
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The plaintiffs, Lindsey Earls and Daniel James, were students at 
Tecumseh High School, and were actively involved in extracurricular 
activities.56  The two students brought suit against the Tecumseh School 
District alleging that the Policy violated their Fourth Amendment57 
rights as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment58 and requested 
injunctive and declaratory relief.59  The student plaintiffs and their 
parents challenged the provisions of the Policy which require random 
suspicionless drug testing of students participating in non-athletic 
activities.60  The plaintiffs further alleged that the school district failed to 
identify a special need for testing students who participated in non-
athletic extracurricular activities, and that the drug testing Policy neither 
addressed a proven drug problem in the Tecumseh school district nor 
assured the Policy would benefit the students or the school.61 
 
outside the stall and listens for the normal sounds of urination to make sure the specimen is not 
tampered with.  Id.  The monitor then takes the specimen and checks it in the student’s presence to 
verify the warmth and appearance of the specimen.  Id. at 1291 n.39.  The results of the urinalysis 
are not given to police and there is no academic sanction imposed.  Earls v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Tecumseh Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County [Earls II], 242 F.3d 1264, 1268 (10th Cir. 
2001).  Random drug testing using these procedures occurred on eight occasions during the previous 
school year.  Id. at 1267-68. 
 56. Earls I, 115 F. Supp.2d at 1282.  Lindsey Earls was a member of the Tecumseh High 
School show choir, the marching band, the academic team, and the National Honors Society.  Earls 
III, 536 U.S. at 826.  Daniel James was seeking to participate in the academic team for the 1999-
2000 school year.  Id.  The Board of Education and the Tecumseh Public Schools presented the 
district court with allegations concerning Daniel James’ standing to sue because he had failing 
grades that made him ineligible to participate in any competitive extracurricular activity.  Earls I, 
115 F. Supp.2d at 1282, n.1.  The Plaintiffs argue that Daniel James’ failing grades were the result 
of an unreasonable suspension from school.  Id.  The district court stated there was no evidence that 
Lindsey Earls lacked standing to litigate and therefore the court must reach the merits of the 
Plaintiff’s constitutional claim.  Id. 
 57. See U.S. CONST. amend IV.  California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 921 (1979) (stating 
“the Fourth Amendment [is] applicable to the States by incorporation through the Fourteenth 
Amendment”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (stating the Fourth Amendment’s right of 
privacy is enforceable against the states through the due process clause). 
 58. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The Fourteenth Amendment states: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Id. 
 59. Earls III, 536 U.S. at 827. 
 60. Earls I, 115 F. Supp.2d at 1283.  The Plaintiffs did not challenge the Policy as it applies to 
the random suspicionless drug testing of students participating on athletic teams or insofar as it 
requires drug testing of all students upon reasonable, individualized suspicion.  Earls I, 115 F. 
Supp.2d at 1283, n.6. 
 61. Earls III, 536 U.S. at 827.  Plaintiffs argue the existence of a special need is a threshold 
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B.  The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma 
The district court rejected the students’ claim that the drug testing 
policy was unconstitutional and granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant school district.62  First, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
argument that the defendants needed to show a severe and immediate 
drug problem in the school district, similar to the problem that existed in 
Vernonia, to demonstrate a “special need” justifying a drug testing 
policy.63  Next, the court employed the factors enumerated in Vernonia 
to determine whether the drug testing policy constituted a reasonable 
search under the Fourth Amendment.64  Looking to the first factor, the 
court found that the privacy interests to be protected were “diminished 
by virtue of the Plaintiffs’ position as children in a public school setting” 
and the voluntaries of participating in extracurricular activities.65 
 
test under the Tenth Circuit’s decision in 19 Solid Waste Dept. Mechs. v. City of Albuquerque,  156 
F.3d 1068 (10th Cir. 1998), and that the school district failed to demonstrate that a drug problem 
existed among the students to be tested, so no special need existed.  Earls II, 242 F.3d at 1269-70. 
 62. Earls I, 115 F. Supp.2d at 1296.  Summary judgment is required when “there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  The moving party has the initial burden of informing the court of the 
basis of its motion and identifying the matter it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue 
of material fact.  Celotox v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  Once the moving party satisfies this 
initial burden, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of 
material fact for trial.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
 63. Earls I, 115 F. Supp.2d at 1284-85.  Plaintiffs point out that, in approving the drug testing 
policy in Vernonia, the Supreme Court stressed the severity and immediacy of the drug problem the 
school district faced.  Id. at 1284.  The district court stated it did not think the opinion in Vernonia 
was limited to “circumstances where the drug problem had reached such magnitude.”  Id. at 1285.   
In determining whether Defendants have demonstrated a ‘special need’ sufficient to 
justify suspicionless drug testing, the Court does not focus solely upon evidence of 
actual use or possession of illegal drugs by students . . . but such other factors as the 
cultural or social atmosphere in which students spoke openly of illegal drug use . . . 
phone calls to school board members from parents; and the plea of a concerned 
mother . . . . 
Id. at 1286.  While the evidence in this case does not show a drug problem as severe as 
Vernonia, it definitely shows a legitimate cause for concern.  Id. at 1287. 
 64. See Earls I, 115 F. Supp.2d at 1288-1296 (discussing every factor in the Vernonia 
analysis as it applies to the circumstances in the present case). 
 65. Earls I, 115 F. Supp.2d at 1296.  The court relied on the reasoning set forth in Vernonia 
stating that simply being a student in a public school automatically creates a lowered expectation of 
privacy.  Id. at 1289-90.  Similar to students in athletic programs, students participating in non-
athletic extracurricular activities will be subjected to additional rules and regulations that do not 
apply to the student body as a whole, and thus these students’ privacy expectations are diminished 
further.  Id.  The district court clarified that the nature of communal dress and undress engaged by 
students involved in extracurricular activities was of minor importance, even though discussed in 
Vernonia.  Id.  The decision in Vernonia does not imply that only athletes’ legitimate expectation of 
privacy is diminished among public school students.  Id.  The most important element of Vernonia 
was that the policy was furthering the government’s responsibilities as guardian and tutor of 
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Analyzing the second factor, the court stated that the character of 
the intrusion was minimal.66  Finally, the court found that the Policy was 
effective in addressing the special governmental concern of preventing 
drug use by school children entrusted to its care.67  Accordingly, the 
district court concluded that Tecumseh’s drug testing policy constituted 
a reasonable search, and therefore was permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment.68 
C.  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district courts decision.69  
The Tenth Circuit agreed that the district had demonstrated a “special 
need” permitting a relaxing of Fourth Amendment requirements,70 but 
concluded that the Tecumseh policy was unconstitutional based upon the 
factors set forth in Vernonia.71  Looking at the first factor, the Tenth 
 
children, and not the exclusive application to student athletes, which the Vernonia court found 
central to it’s analysis.  Id. at 1289 n.31. 
 66. Earls I, 115 F. Supp.2d at 1295.  The court noted that the testing procedure was almost 
identical to the one in Vernonia, where the Supreme Court held the character of the intrusion 
negligible.  Id. at 1291.  The setting and condition is identical to those typically encountered in 
public restrooms.  Id.  The school district Policy contains an express provision to ensure 
confidentiality of prescription drug information and the results of the tests, and absent evidence 
indicating actual breach of privacy concerning these matters, the court will not assume the worst.  
Id. at 1294-95. 
 67. Earls I, 115 F. Supp.2d at 1295.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Vernonia does not 
require the school district to target students most likely to use drugs.  Id.  The drug problem among 
the entire student body is “effectively addressed by making sure that the large number of students 
participating in competitive extracurricular activities do not use drugs.”  Id. 
 68. Earls I, 115 F. Supp.2d at 1296. 
 69. Earls II, 242 F.3d at 1279.  The students argued that the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997), required courts to first decide whether the school has 
established the existence of a special need before the court balances the students privacy interest 
against the government’s interest.  Id. at 1269.  In deciding if the government has established a 
special need, courts need to inquire, (1) whether the government’s concerns are “real” by asking if 
the drug testing program was adopted due to a documented drug abuse problem or whether drug 
abuse by the group to be tested would pose a danger to the public, and (2) whether the drug testing 
met the goals of detection and deterrence. 19 Solid Waste Dept. Mechs. v. City of Albuquerque, 156 
F.3d 1068, 1073 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 70. Earls II, 242 F.3d at 1270 (discussing how the Supreme Court explicitly stated in 
Vernonia that “special needs” exist in the public school context making adherence to the Fourth 
Amendment requirements impractical).  “Whether or not the Supreme Court has raised the bar in 
other contexts, we must assume, until the Court directs us otherwise, that the analysis in Vernonia 
governs . . . .”.  Id.  Even if the Tenth Circuit agreed with plaintiff that the Chandler decision raised 
the bar to find a special need in the school context, the Tecumseh School District has still 
demonstrated a special need.  Id. at 1270, n.4. 
 71. Id. at 1272 (discussing how applying the Vernonia factors to the Tecumseh Policy results 
in a different conclusion).  Before engaging in analysis of the three factors set forth in Vernonia, the 
Tenth Circuit noted that evidence of drug use among students subjected to the Tecumseh Policy was 
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Circuit agreed with the district court that participants in non-athletic 
extracurricular activities have a somewhat lesser expectation of 
privacy.72  The Tenth Circuit also agreed with the district court that the 
character of the intrusion was not significant.73  However, the Tenth 
Circuit stated the nature and immediacy of the government’s concern 
was lacking, which tipped the balancing decidedly toward the 
plaintiffs.74  Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Tecumseh’s 
 
far from epidemic, which differentiated the case from Vernonia.  Id. at 1272. 
 72. Earls II, 242 F.3d at 1276.  The Tecumseh School District argued that students 
participating in extracurricular activities have reduced privacy expectations because: (1) they 
voluntarily participate, (2) travel out of town where they share sleeping quarters and use communal 
bathrooms, and (3) they agree to follow additional rules set by the District and the OSSAA.  Id. at 
1275.  The Tenth Circuit stated the most significant factor in its decision was that students in 
extracurricular activities subject themselves to additional rules and regulations.  Id.  An additional 
rule “inevitably requires that their personal freedom to conduct themselves is, in some small way, 
constrained at least for some time.”  Id. at 1276.  The Tenth Circuit stated that voluntary 
participation without more should not reduce a student’s privacy expectation in his/her bodily fluids 
by stating most members of society voluntarily engage in activities and do not suffer reduced 
privacy expectations.  Id. at 1276.  The Tenth Circuit declined to give much weight to the School 
District’s argument concerning communal undress because they doubted the Supreme Court 
intended students privacy expectations to rest upon the degree the student showers or dresses with 
other students.  Id. at 1275. 
 73. Id.  In Vernonia, the student entered an empty locker room with a same sex adult monitor, 
produced a urine sample at a urinal or a stall, and the monitor listened for normal sounds of 
urination.  See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 650 (discussing the testing procedure in Vernonia).  The only 
difference between the testing procedures was under Tecumseh’s Policy male students produce 
sample behind closed stall doors.  See Earl I, 115 F. Supp.2d at 1291, n.35 (explaining the testing 
procedures in Earls). 
 74. Earls II, 242 F.3d at 1276.  The Tenth Circuit noted that the government’s interest in 
deterring drug use among students is very important, but pointed out in Vernonia the Supreme Court 
emphasized the particular physical danger to athletes using drugs.  Id.  The Tenth Circuit 
acknowledged the immediacy of the government’s concern was wanting given the lack of evidence 
of a drug abuse problem among the students to be tested and cautioned that unless school districts 
are required to demonstrate an identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of 
students in the group to be tested, schools could perceivably test any and all students regardless of 
suspicion. Id. at 1277-78.  There is no line at which one could say a drug abuse problem is severe 
enough to warrant suspicionless drug testing.  Id.  To ensure drug testing will redress the perceived 
drug problem, a school district seeking to impose a suspicionless drug testing policy must 
demonstrate an identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of students in the group 
to be tested.  Id.  See Book, supra note 31, at 650-53 (discussing how courts should use group 
suspicion but also have to demonstrate that an actual or imminent problem exists within the group 
for the drug test to be constitutional); Charles W. Chotvacs, The Fourth Amendment Warrant 
Requirement: Constitutional Protection or Legal Fiction?  Noted Exceptions Recognized by the 
Tenth Circuit, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 331, 347 (2002) (mentioning if school districts do not have to 
demonstrate a perceivable problem before implementing suspicionless drug testing policies, their 
ability to invade upon the rights of students would be limitless); Zachary A. Bulthuis, Note, 
Suspicionless Drug Testing By Public Actors: How Chandler v. Miller Should Change the Standard, 
74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1549, 1576-77 (2001) (discussing how efforts by the Supreme Court to curb 
drug abuse by suspicionless drug testing is means to achieve social control, and how suspicionless 
drug tests should only be used where there is real danger, not symbolic).  The Tenth Circuit stated 
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drug testing Policy was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.75 
D.  The United States Supreme Court 
1.  Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court, with a five-justice majority, reversed the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals decision.76  Applying the principles in 
Vernonia to the somewhat different facts presented in Earls, the Court 
concluded that the Tecumseh policy did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.77 
Considering first the nature of the privacy interest alleged, the 
Supreme Court concluded that students participating in extracurricular 
activities have a diminished expectation of privacy.78  The Supreme 
Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that students participating in non-
athletic extracurricular activities have stronger privacy expectations 
 
that without evidence of drug abuse among the target group of students, the usefulness of the Policy 
to the perceived problem is diminished.  Earls II, 242 F.3d at 1276.  The Tenth Circuit rejected the 
School District’s argument that students engaged in non-athletic extracurricular activities who use 
drugs are exposed to the same type of physical harm as athletes who use drugs.  Id. at 1277.  The 
School District also argued the degree of supervision is a sufficient reason for testing because all 
extracurricular students are subjected to less supervision than ordinary students in the classroom.  
Id.  The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument stating the argument created an imperfect match 
between the need to test and the students tested because many students not participating in 
extracurricular activities are less supervised while at lunch than in the classroom.  Id. at 1278. 
 75. Earls II, 242 F.3d at 1278 (applying all the factors enumerated in Vernonia, the testing 
Policy was unconstitutional).  The court of appeals agreed with the district court that the drug 
testing policy should be evaluated by taking into consideration the uniqueness of the school setting.  
Id. at 1270.  In its holding, the Tenth Circuit stressed that its decision should not be interpreted as 
requiring a school to wait until it identifies a drug abuse problem of “epidemic proportions.”  Id. at 
1278. 
 76. Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. 
Earls [Earls III], 56 U.S. 822 (2002).  Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Breyer joined.  Id. at 824.  Justice Breyer filed a separate 
concurring opinion stressing certain factors the Court relied on when making its decision.  Id. 
 77. Id. at 830 (discussing the major differences as the non extracurricular activities to be 
regulated in Earls did not require regular physicals or communal undress).  Furthermore, the 
Tecumseh schools had not identified a drug problem as severe and pronounced as the one that 
existed in the Vernonia school district.  Id. at 836.  There was also evidence that demonstrated the 
Tecumseh school district had been careless in keeping the students’ test results and information 
gathered during the testing confidential.  Id. 
 78. Id. at 830-32 (discussing reasons students in extracurricular activities have diminished 
expectations of privacy).  Every student’s privacy interests are limited in the public school 
environment because the State acts as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care.  Id. at 830 
(citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665).  The Court by way of example discussed that because the State 
is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety, it requires students to routinely submit 
to physical examinations to test for disease.  Id. at 830-31 (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656). 
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss1/4
KUCHARSON2.DOC 2/16/2004  11:02 AM 
2004] PLEASE REPORT TO THE PRINCIPAL’S OFFICE, URINE TROUBLE 149 
because they are not subject to regular physical and communal undress 
as were the Vernonia athletes.79  The Court stated that, “this distinction, 
however, was not essential in Vernonia.”80  Next, the Court analyzed the 
nature of the intrusion imposed by the Tecumseh policy and concluded 
that the method of collection was a negligible intrusion.81  The plaintiffs 
argued that the intrusion was significant because the Policy failed to 
effectively protect against the confidential information being disclosed 
to unauthorized school officials.82  The Court rejected this argument 
acknowledging the school Policy provided adequate precautions and 
stated, “one example of alleged carelessness hardly increases the 
character of the intrusion.”83  Finally, in considering the nature and 
immediacy of the government’s concern and the efficacy of Tecumseh’s 
policy in redressing them, the Court concluded the government’s 
 
 79. Id. at 831 (discussing how the plaintiffs attempted to distinguish its case from the facts of 
Vernonia premised on degree of communal undress associated with the different extracurricular 
activities).  In plaintiffs’ brief they discuss how students in the choir are able to change in and out of 
their choir uniforms on the school bus without being nude unlike athletes who completely disrobe in 
locker rooms.  See Brief for Resp’t at 20, Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie 
County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, No. 01-332 (2002). 
 80. Id. at 831.  “In upholding the drug testing program in Vernonia, we considered the school 
context ‘central’ and ‘the most significant element.’”  Id. at 831 n.3.  The hefty weight given to the 
school being a guardian and tutor of children entrusted in its care applies with similar force in this 
case.  Id.  Even if the court accepted the students’ distinction regarding communal undress and 
privacy expectations, the students’ expectations of privacy are alone limited by participating in 
extracurricular activities.  Id. at 832.  By participating in extracurricular activities students 
voluntarily agree to adhere to additional rules and requirements that do not apply to the student 
body as a whole.  Id. 
 81. Id. at 832.  The court noted that urination is an excretory function that has generally been 
equated with great privacy.  Id. (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626). The degree of intrusion in 
collecting urine samples depends on the way the urinalysis is conducted.  Id. The procedure of 
collecting urine in Earls is nearly identical to the procedure used in Vernonia, which was previously 
stated as a negligible intrusion.  Id.  The method of collecting urine in Earls additionally protected 
the students privacy by allowing male students to produce their urine sample behind a closed stall 
door instead of an urinal.  Id. at 833. 
 82. Id. at 833.  The students specifically state that the school had been careless in protecting 
personal information obtained as a result of the testing.  Id.  As an example, the students claim the 
Choir teacher looked at students’ prescription drug list and left the list exposed allowing other 
students to look.  Id. 
 83. Id. (explaining the precautions the Policy takes in making sure the students’ test results 
are kept confidential).  The Policy requires that the test results are kept confidential in separate files 
from the students’ academic records.  Id. These confidential files are only released to school 
personnel on a “need to know basis.”  Id.  The court stated that the choir teacher was a school 
official who “needed to know” because during overnight trips the teacher needs to know which of 
her students take what medications.  Id.  The nature of the intrusion is lessened by the fact that the 
test results are not turned over to any law enforcement authority or have any academic 
consequences besides limiting the student’s privilege to participate in competitive extracurricular 
activities.  Id. 
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concern was important84 and that Policy “effectively serve[d] the 
Tecumseh School District’s interest in protecting the safety and health of 
its students.”85  In holding so, the Court dismissed the students’ 
arguments that, (1) a real and immediate interest needs to exist to justify 
a policy testing non-athletes,86 (2) testing of non-athletes does not 
implicate safety concerns, which is a crucial factor in the special needs 
theater,87 and (3) drug testing should be based upon individualized 
suspicion to reduce the intrusiveness of the search.88 
Using the Vernonia balancing test, the majority concluded that the 
Tecumseh School District’s legitimate concern of preventing drug use 
among its students outweighed the privacy expectations of students 
wishing to participate in extracurricular activities.89  Therefore, the 
Tecumseh Policy did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of the 
 
 84. Id. at 834.  The court stated it already discussed the nature of the government’s concern in 
keeping students off drugs in Vernonia, and how that concern remains.  Id.  Evidence suggests that 
the drug problem among school children has increased since Vernonia, making the concern even 
greater.  Id.  Identical to Vernonia, the need for the state to act is greater when the evil trying to be 
abated concerns children entrusted to its care.  Id.  The nationwide drug epidemic makes the war 
against drugs a pressing concern in every school.  Id. 
 85. Id. at 838.  Drug testing students participating in extracurricular activities is a reasonably 
effective way of redressing the Tecumseh School District’s legitimate concern of stopping drug use.  
Id. at 837.  Vernonia requires schools to consider the constitutionality of their actions “within the 
context of their custodial duties,” and does not require schools to test the group of students most 
likely to be abusing drugs.  Id. at 838.  Findings of fact that the drug problem is “fueled” by a 
certain group of students is not essential to determining if a school’s policy effectively addresses a 
school’s concerns of preventing and stopping drug abuse.  Id. 
 86. Id. at 835.  A demonstrated problem of drug abuse is not in every case essential to 
determining the validity of a testing policy.  Id.  Some showing of drug use among the student body 
does “shore up an assertion of special need” for the suspicionless drug-testing program.  Id.  In the 
past, the Supreme Court has not required an identified drug problem as a prerequisite before the 
government conducts suspicionless drug testing.  Id.  See Nat’l Treasury, 489 U.S. at 656 (holding 
suspicionless drug test of custom service agents on a preventive basis).  The proven nationwide 
epidemic of drug use among school children establishes it is reasonable for Tecumseh to enact a 
drug testing policy.  Earls III, 536 U.S. at 836. 
 87. Id. at 836.  Plaintiffs’ argument goes as far as to state that there needs to exist 
“extraordinary safety and national security hazards” before the Fourth Amendment requirements 
can be relaxed.  Id. (citing Resp’t Br. at 25-26).  Safety concerns are no doubt part of the special 
needs analysis, but the safety interest of keeping schoolchildren off drugs is substantial for all 
children, whether athletes or not.  Id.  Drug use by children creates considerable health risks, which 
is enough of a safety hazard to determine that a special need exists.  Id. 
 88. Id. at 837.  A Policy based on individualized suspicion might unfairly target students who 
are members of unpopular groups.  Id.  “The fear of lawsuits resulting from such targeted searches 
may chill enforcement of the program, rendering it ineffective in combating drug use.”  Id.  
Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment does not require the government to use the least 
intrusive search because this would create “insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all 
search-and-seizure powers.”  Id. 
 89. Earls III, 536 U.S. at 837. 
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students.90 
2.  Concurring Opinion 
Justice Breyer, in his concurring opinion, reached the same 
conclusion given by the majority opinion, but stressed several 
underlying considerations that were consistent with the majority’s 
opinion.91  First, Justice Breyer emphasized the seriousness of the drug 
problem in America’s schools and how the government’s attempts at 
“supply side interdiction” to stop the problem have failed.92  Second, 
since public schools act in loco parentis,93 it is mandatory that schools 
“shoulder the burden” in stopping the drug problem.94  Thirdly, 
regarding the privacy intrusions drug testing imposes on students, he 
emphasized that people have different opinions about whether producing 
a urine sample is embarrassing.95  Justice Breyer concluded that he was 
unsure if Tecumseh’s drug testing program would work, but based on 
the considerations he emphasized, he felt the drug-testing program was 
constitutional.96 
 
 90. Id. at 838. 
 91. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).  Vernonia governs this case and requires reversal of the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision.  Id.  The Tecumseh Policy addresses a serious national drug problem and does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
 92. Id. at 839 (Breyer, J., concurring).  “[T]he drug problem in our Nation’s schools is serious 
in terms to size, the kinds of drugs being used, and the consequences of that use both for our 
children and the rest of us.” Id.  The government’s emphasis upon supply side interdiction 
apparently has not reduced teenage use in recent years.  Id.  Supply side programs account for sixty-
six percent of the federal drug control budget, but drug use has increased.  Id. (citing R. Perl, CRS 
Issue Brief for Congress, Drug Control: International Policy and Options, CRS-1 (Dec. 12, 2001)). 
 93. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655 (stating a school becomes in loco parentis when a parent 
delegates part of his parental authority to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child).  Part of the 
authority granted is the power to restrain and correct the child.  Id. 
 94. Earls III, 536 U.S. at 840 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that schools must find an 
effective way to deal with the national drug problem among schoolchildren because the schools 
acting in loco parentis need to protect children and instill habits and manners of civility in their 
students).  If the schools do not carry out these responsibilities, then parents may start to send their 
children to private schools.  Id. 
 95. Id. at 841 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that some people find urine sampling 
procedures no more intrusive than going to the doctor for a routine examination, but others are 
seriously embarrassed).  Justice Breyer stressed it is a close and debatable question of whether 
producing a urine sample is only a negligible intrusion, and the best way to resolve this question is 
to air out the differences at public meetings.  Id.  By getting the whole community involved, the 
school board, in this case, was able to reveal that there was little objection to the Tecumseh policy.  
Id.  Allowing the whole community to be involved by discussing the differences of opinions of what 
is the best procedure to follow when conducting the test, would make the testing seem less intrusive.  
Id.  See Harrison supra note 44, at 403 (discussing compulsive urinalysis has been recognized as 
very invasive procedure for many people). 
 96. Earls III, 536 U.S. at 842 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that despite the possibility of 
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3.  Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting justices believed that the Court should have reached 
a different result when it applied the factors enumerated in Vernonia to a 
school policy that tested all students wishing to participate in non-
athletic extracurricular activities.97  Writing for the dissent, Justice 
Ginsburg stated that the nature of the privacy interest upon which the 
search intruded was stronger than the majority expressed,98 the character 
of the intrusion complained of was more than negligible due to evidence 
of the school district’s carelessness,99 and that the nature and immediacy 
of the government’s concern in Vernonia “dwarfed” the concerns facing 
the Tecumseh School District.100  Therefore the dissenters concluded 
that the judgment of the Tenth Circuit declaring the Tecumseh policy 
unconstitutional should be affirmed.101 
 
the school’s drug testing policy failing, the facts emphasized in the concurring opinion lead him to 
conclude the drug testing program was not unreasonable, constitutionally speaking). 
 97. Id. at 843 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter joined in the 
opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg.  Id. at 842.  The Vernonia Court focused on the increased risk 
of sports-related injuries associated with drug use and that the Vernonia athletes were the leaders of 
an identified drug culture; neither factor was a concern in Earls.  Id. at 843.  Vernonia can’t be held 
to permit suspicionless drug testing of all student solely because drugs have health risks associated 
with them, because student engage in many other activities that jeopardize their health on their own 
time.  Id. at 844.  The Vernonia drug testing program was directed at drug use by school athletes 
where the risk of harm to the student athlete impaired by drugs is high.  Id. at 851.  One could 
maybe stretch the risk of harm to band members who may trip and have their tubas collide, but the 
majority of students who will be tested under Tecumseh’s policy are not engaged in activities where 
the risk of injury is high if the student participates while under the influence of drugs.  Id. at 852. 
 98. Id. at 848 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Unlike in athletic participation where communal 
undress is inherent to participation, students participating in non-athletic extracurricular activities 
are rarely faced with situations where there is communal undress.  Id. at 848 n.1.  Students in choir 
have found ways of changing without anyone seeing them nude, and the out-of-town trips students 
take are generally limited to changing in enclosed restroom stalls, a condition that did not exist in 
Vernonia.  Id.  Competitive extracurricular activities serve students that have a variety of 
personality characteristics, from modest and shy to bold and uninhibited.  Id. at 847. 
 99. Earls III, 536 U.S. at 848 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  The assumption that the provisions 
in the Tecumseh policy providing for confidentiality will be honored is not warranted.  Id. at 849.  
The character of the intrusion is heightened in Earls because there is evidence that the School 
District carelessly handled personal information collected from drug testing.  Id.  There was 
evidence that the choir teacher left information concerning students’ prescription drug use unlocked 
and unsealed where other students could see them.  Id. at 848. 
 100. Id. at 849 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Vernonia initiated its drug testing policy to combat a 
situation where the school was in a state of rebellion that was largely due to the increased drug use 
among the student body.  Id.  The Tecumseh School district has repeatedly reported to the federal 
government prior to the implementation of the Policy that a drug abuse was not a problem in the 
school district.  Id.  Without demonstrating that a drug problem exists, the effectiveness of the 
Policy in correcting the problem is greatly diminished.  Id. at 850. 
 101. Id. at 855 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  “Special Needs” Doctrine is Subjective Absurdity 
Earls gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to halt its continuing 
consumption of individual’s rights by engaging in a judicial whimsy 
labeled as “special needs” balancing.102  The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Earls rested in large part upon the importance of the governmental 
concern in preventing drug use by school children entrusted to the 
school’s care.103  Preventing drug use has consistently been used to 
uphold suspicionless drug tests in other arenas outside the school 
walls.104  However, in Chandler v. Miller, the most recent preceding case 
involving suspicionless drug testing, the Supreme Court demonstrated 
that the special needs analysis can be twisted to fit any result the Court 
desires.105  The incongruity between the Earls and Chandler decisions 
 
 102. Earls III, 536 U.S. 822; George M. Dery III, Are Politicians More Deserving of Privacy 
Than Schoolchildren?  How Chandler v. Miller Exposed the Absurdities of Fourth Amendment 
“Special Needs” Balacing, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 73, 75 (1998) (discussing how the special needs 
balancing the Supreme Court uses is standardless and can create inconsistencies in the Court’s 
decisions).  The special needs balancing analysis developed by the Court cannot be considered an 
analysis at all.  Id. at 89.  The balancing used by the Court is nothing more than a subjective view 
regarding the acceptability of the government intrusion in question.  Id.; Parr, supra note 32 at 274 
(“Because the special needs test has no clear standards, ‘danger looms that the Court [will] serv[e] 
an ideological agenda and using the convenience of a balancing test. . .’”); Krislen Nalani Chun, 
Casenote, Still Wondering After All These Years: Ferguson v. City of Charleston and the Supreme 
Court’s Lack of Guidance Over Drug Testing and the Special Needs Doctrine, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 
797, 812-819 (2002) (discussing how the special needs doctrine can be bent in any direction that the 
Justices of the Supreme Court, public policy, or issues at national attention dictate at the expense of 
personal privacy). 
 103. Earls III, 536 U.S. at 834 (discussing the importance of the government’s concern in 
keeping students off drugs that was previously established in Vernonia, and how that concern 
remains in Earls).  The nationwide drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in 
every school.  Id. 
 104. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989) (holding 
suspicionless drug test of railroad workers was constitutional based on compelling government 
interest in having workers operating dangerous equipment free from influence of drugs in order to 
reduce risk of injuries to others); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 
671-72 (1989) (holding suspicionless drug test of custom service agents applying for promotions 
was constitutional based in part on compelling government interest in safeguarding Nation’s borders 
and keeping people who carry firearms off influence of drugs). 
 105. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).  See Dery, supra note 102, at 74 (stating “in the 
surreal world of special needs, any fact can be twisted to fit the desired result without regard for 
Fourth Amendment mainstay”).  In Chandler, the Supreme Court made obvious the malleability of 
special needs balancing and further distorted special needs reasoning and logic.  Id. “Facts can be 
emphasized or ignored in order to reach a preordained result.”  Id.  The special needs test used by 
the Supreme Court is “spineless” and was bent in the Chandler case in the direction of the outcome 
of the Supreme Court’s “latest choosing.”  Id. at 88-89.  Since there is no mention of “special 
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drains the credibility of the special needs doctrine and calls into question 
the real reasons behind the Earls ruling.106 
In Chandler, the Georgia legislature enacted a statute that required 
all candidates for specified state offices to verify they had taken and 
passed a drug test.107  The Supreme Court held the state requirement did 
not fit within the special needs requirement of Fourth Amendment, 
mainly because (1) Georgia had failed to demonstrate a drug use 
problem among state officeholders, and (2) the requirement was not well 
designed to identify candidates who used drugs.108  The Court went on to 
state that making a symbolic gesture to illustrate the government’s 
commitment to fighting drug abuse does not constitute a sufficient 
reason to infringe on personal privacy.109  A “special” need must be 
 
needs” in the Fourth Amendment, the Court shaped the special needs doctrine out of thin air, and 
having such a dubious origin means the doctrine is subject to the Court’s shifting values.  Id. at 102. 
 106. Dery, supra note 102, at 103 (discussing the incongruity between how the Supreme Court 
decided the Chandler case and past precedent involving suspicionless drug testing); Michael E. 
Brewer, Comment, Chandler v. Miller: No Turning Back From a Fourth Amendment 
Reasonableness Analysis, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 275, 291 (1997) (discussing how the Chandler 
decision tends to indicate the Court is halting suspicionless drug testing temporarily because the 
decision was decided contrary to past precedent); Michael Polloway, Comment, Does the Fourth 
Amendment Prohibit Suspicionless Searches – or do Individual Rights Succumb to the 
Government’s “So-Called” Special Needs?, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 143, 171 (stating the 
majority opinion in Chandler demonstrated a divergence from the Court’s previous holdings in 
suspicionless drug testing cases). 
 107. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309 (discussing how the statute passed by the Georgia legislature 
required candidates for certain state offices to certify they had taken a urinalysis drug test within 
thirty days prior to being nominated for office and the test results were negative).  The candidates 
could provide a specimen at a state approved laboratory or at their personal physician’s office. Id. at 
310; Dery, supra note 102, at 87 (discussing if a candidate did test positive for drugs, the result was 
not disclosed to law enforcement if the candidate chose not to file the certificate). If the candidate 
elected to take the urinalysis at his personal physician’s office, no state agent needed to know the 
test was being administered.  Id. 
 108. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318 (discussing why Georgia’s statue was unconstitutional).  
Precedent establishes that the special need for suspicionless drug testing must be important enough 
to override the individual’s privacy interest.  Id.  Nothing in the record indicates that drug use 
among state officeholders is a real problem.  Id. at 319.  Furthermore, Georgia’s requirement is not 
well designed to identify candidates who are drug users or deter drug users from seeking election in 
state offices.  Id. at 319.  See Brewer, supra note 106, at 288 (discussing how Georgia provided no 
immediate or concrete evidence which the drug testing regime would address and attempt to cure); 
Joseph S. Dowdy, Well Isn’t That Special?  The Supreme Court’s Immediate Purpose of Restricting 
The Doctrine Of Special Needs in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1050, 1065 
(2002) (discussing how, after Chandler, a search had to actually achieve its intended goal for it to be 
a constitutional search). 
 109. Brewer, supra note 106, at 288-89; Roger W. Wilkinson, Student Work, Constitutional 
Law – Special Needs Exception For Suspicionless Searches Does Not Extend To Candidate Drug 
Testing – Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997), 31 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 237, 237 (1997) 
(discussing how a social need to prevent drug use constitutes a symbolic need which will not permit 
the suspicionless testing regime to past constitutional scrutiny). 
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exhibited to relax Fourth Amendment protection, which is 
distinguishable from a “symbolic” need.110 
Just five years after Chandler, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to Earls, which contained the same important facts that the Court drew 
on to justify why testing of political candidates was unconstitutional in 
Chandler.111  Specifically, Earls involved a drug-testing regime with no 
immediate or concrete evidence of drug abuse among students 
participating in non-athletic extracurricular activities,112 and the school 
 
 110. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314 (stressing that a special need is one that goes beyond the 
normal needs of law enforcement and exists in situations where an important government interest 
would be thwarted by traditional Fourth Amendment requirements).  Symbolism, or a symbolic 
need, is not a sufficient reason to exempt a search from the traditional Fourth Amendment 
protections.  Brewer, supra note 106, at 288 (discussing how the Supreme Court distinguished the 
importance between a “special” need and a “symbolic” need in terms of what is necessary to relax 
Fourth Amendment protection). 
 111. Compare Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309-13, with Earls III, 536 U.S. at 825-28; Earls III, 536 
U.S. at 855 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing how the facts of Earls is similar to Chandler and 
different from Vernonia.); Tamara A. Dugan, Note, Putting the Glee Club to the Test: 
Reconsidering Mandatory Suspicionless Drug Testing of Students Participating in Extracurricular 
Activities, 28 J. LEGIS. 147, 167-173 (2002) (analyzing the facts surrounding the suspicionless drug 
testing of students in Earls and also analyzing the facts surrounding the suspicionless drug testing of 
political candidates in Chandler). “The factual premise [of Chandler] in some ways bears greater 
resemblance to the testing of students participating in non-athletic extracurricular activities than 
does the factual premise of Vernonia.”  Id. at 177.  Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Chandler, it seems highly unlikely that school districts and the Court could justify suspicionless 
drug testing of all students participating in extracurricular activities.  Id. 
 112. Earls III, 536 U.S. at 834-35 (discussing the evidence of drug use of students at Tecumseh 
schools generally, and not specifically demonstrating drug use by students participating in 
extracurricular activities).  “Viewing the evidence as a whole, it cannot be reasonably disputed that 
the [School District] was faced with a ‘drug problem’ when it adopted the [drug testing] policy.”  Id. 
at 835.  Unlike Vernonia, where the athletes tested were the leaders of the drug culture, there is no 
reason or justification given in Earls for testing all students engaging in extracurricular activities.  
Id. at 852-53 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  The only evidence presented to support Tecumseh students’ 
general use of drugs was the testimony of teachers that students talked openly about drugs, and that 
a drug dog found a marijuana cigarette close to the school grounds.  Id. at 834-35.  There is even 
less evidence that students participating in extracurricular activities used drugs – police officers 
found drug paraphernalia in a car driven by a Future Farmers of America member.  Id.  Tecumseh 
has repeatedly reported to the federal government before implementing the drug testing policy that 
drug use, besides alcohol and tobacco, was not a major problem within the school district.  Id. at 
849 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  See Dugan, supra note 111, at 167 (discussing how Earls 
exemplifies a case that includes no findings that students who engage in non-athletic extracurricular 
activities are more likely than other students to engage in drug use).  The Court even concluded that 
the Tecumseh school district had failed to establish a drug problem that the drug testing would 
combat.  Matthew A. Pring, The Death of a Doctrine: The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and 
Random Suspicionless Urine Drug Tests Eroding the “Special Needs Doctrine,” 79 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 457, 481-82 (2002) (stating how the Tecumseh School District “spent little time establishing 
the drug problems in the school district, and did not demonstrate that the [drug testing] policy was 
geared toward the core of the drug culture”).  Reviewing the history of the random drug test results 
that had previously been given to students in extracurricular activities, illustrated that a serious drug 
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district failed to demonstrate that the drug testing policy was well 
designed to identify student drug users.113  Surprisingly, the drug testing 
Policy in Earls was held constitutional despite facts that the children 
were subjected to more intrusive testing procedures114 and had little 
control to which school personnel the test results were disseminated.115  
It is difficult to find a concrete justification of why the Court, only a few 
years earlier relying on similar facts, determined that obligating 
politicians to submit urine samples crossed the constitutional line, but a 
more invasive search concerning students does not.116  The Court’s 
 
problem did not exist in Tecumseh.  Id. at 482. 
 113. Earls III, 536 U.S. at 838 (stating how the Court only holds that the Tecumseh policy is a 
reasonable means of furthering the school district’s interest in keeping students off drugs, not that it 
is an effective means of deterring drug use among the specific students being tested).  Tecumseh’s 
drug testing policy falls short of deterring students who are in the most danger of using drugs.  Id. at 
853 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  See Dugan, supra note 111, at 180 (maintaining that the drug testing 
policy implemented in Earls does not put the focus where it needs to be—upon students who the 
school has “reasonable grounds to believe” are using drugs); Pring, supra note 112, at 482 (stating 
how the Tecumseh drug testing policy was not an effective deterrent because it tested students who 
did not have a history of a drug problem and who were not exposed to safety concerns associated 
with student drug use); Chotvacs, supra note 74, at 347 (mentioning if school districts do not have 
to demonstrate a perceivable problem before acting, their ability to invade upon the rights of 
students would be limitless); Book, supra note 31, at 650-54  (discussing how courts should use 
group suspicion but have to demonstrate an actual or imminent problem existing within a group for 
the drug test to be constitutional).  But see Shannon D. Landreth, Note, An Extension of the Special 
Needs Doctrine to Permit Drug Testing of Curfew Violators, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1247, 1267 
(2001) (requiring teacher or school official to formulate suspicion before implementing a drug test 
is problematic because they lack proper training). 
 114. See Earls I, 115 F. Supp.2d at 1291, n.35.  (discussing how the Policy stated the urine 
specimen should be collected in a restroom or other private bathroom facility behind a closed stall.)  
The principal or athletic director designates a school official of the same sex as the student to 
accompany the student to the stall, and observe the student while the specimen is being produced.  
Id.  The monitor stands outside the stall and listens for the normal sounds of urination to make sure 
the specimen is not tampered with.  Id.  Compare this to the process in Chandler, 520 U.S. at 310 
(discussing how candidates could provide a specimen at a State approved laboratory or at their 
personal physician’s office).  See Dery, supra note 102, at 85 (discussing if the candidate elected to 
take the urinalysis at his personal physician’s office, no state agent needed to know the test was 
being administered).  The procedures in Vernonia, to which Earls has been compared, expose 
students to more intrusive and potentially more humiliating testing procedures.  Id. at 74. 
 115. Compare Earls, 536 U.S. at 833 (discussing how the Tecumseh policy requires students’ 
test results to be given to school personnel only who are on a “need to know” basis of the results), 
with Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309 (a candidate could prevent disclosure of the test results by choosing 
not to file the certificate reporting he or she took a urinalysis).  In Vernonia, to which Earls III is 
similar, students had less control to whom their test results were released.  Dery, supra note 102, at 
74.  No state agent even needs to be notified that a particular political candidate has taken or will 
take a urinalysis.  Id at 85. 
 116. Dery, supra note 102, at 89 (discussing how the inconsistency concerning the Chandler 
decision and past precedent make the Courts reasoning less credible). “After years of sustaining 
more intrusive searches of railroad employees, Custom Service officers, and schoolchildren, the 
Court, for some reason, decided that compelling politicians to urinate into a cup crossed the line.”  
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss1/4
KUCHARSON2.DOC 2/16/2004  11:02 AM 
2004] PLEASE REPORT TO THE PRINCIPAL’S OFFICE, URINE TROUBLE 157 
disparate treatment of politicians and schoolchildren is conclusive 
evidence that the special needs analysis used by the Court is a “factual 
tug-of-war” rooted in nothing more than a subjective view of the 
tolerability of “certain government intrusions.”117  The outcome of 
suspicionless drug testing cases is determined by which side of the scale 
the Court believes it should place its “judicial thumb.”118 
B.  What is More Dangerous, “Stoned” Politicians or “Stoned” Band 
Members? 
The Supreme Court unconvincingly tried to justify the 
inconsistencies between Earls and Chandler by citing previous cases 
 
Id.  See Chun, supra note 102, at 811 (discussing the outcome in Chandler cannot be reconciled 
with holdings concerning the suspicionless drug testing of students).  It will no longer be 
“increasingly routine for citizens to suffer the indignity, embarrassment, and inconvenience of 
unjustified warrantless police searches all in the name of the government’s drug war.”  Keleigh 
Biggins, Casenote, Candidates for Public Office Exempt From Drug Testing – Supreme Court Rules 
There is No Special Need Justifying a Departure from Fourth Amendment Requirements Chandler 
v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997), 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 781, 797 (discussing how Chandler narrowed the 
circumstances in which a “special need” will be found). 
 117. Dery, supra note 102, at 88 (stating after Chandler it was apparent that without the 
traditional Fourth Amendment protections of warrants and probable cause, the special needs 
analysis “devolves into a factual tug-of-war founded on little more than a subjective view regarding 
the acceptability of certain government intrusions.”); Dodson, supra note 17, at 275 (discussing how 
the special needs balancing test amounts to nothing more than how the Supreme Court Justices feel 
about a particular law).  The vagueness of the special needs test allows courts to freely pick and 
choose which problems in society they feel are bad enough to permit abandonment of constitutional 
guarantees under the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 276-77.  “The balancing test used when the Court 
invokes the special need doctrine is highly subjective.”  Id. at 288.  See Chun, supra note 102, at 
811 (discussing how an examination of the inconsistencies regarding suspicionless drug testing 
cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court engages in a picking and choosing game concerning 
whose Fourth Amendment rights will be subjected to the special needs exception).  The Court did 
nothing more than apply subjectivity in order to decide Chandler in favor of personal liberties 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  See Oshman, supra note 29, at 1335 (discussing how the 
Court has failed to consistently define what constitutes a special need, which has allowed a high 
degree of judicial subjectivity producing an outcome determinative test that will support the search 
being challenged). 
 118. Dery, supra note 102, at 89 (discussing how the outcome of suspicionless drug testing 
cases are decided on what the Court personally feels is an offensive invasion of constitutionally 
protected privacy).  When the Court feels that a particular intrusion should be permitted, it 
emphasizes the State’s interest and minimizes the privacy interests of the individuals.  Id.  
Conversely, as Chandler illustrates, if the Court believes the government testing is offensive, the 
Court simply places its judicial thumb on the other side of the scale.  Id.  Facts in each case can be 
emphasized by the Court, or ignored, in order to reach a predetermined result.  Id. at 88-89.  See 
Oshman, supra note 29, at 1335-36 (discussing how the special needs balancing used by the Court 
tilts the judicial scale decisively in favor of the government interest being promoted and against 
individual privacy); Katrina Quicker, Note, Discrimination Perfected to a Science: The Evolution of 
the Supreme Court’s War on Drugs, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 677, 678 (1999) (stating “courts are 
afforded wide-open and free-wheeling discretion in employing the [special needs] balancing test”). 
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where it held that a particular or immediate drug problem is not required 
before allowing the government to conduct suspicionless drug testing.119  
Specifically, the Court referenced Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. 
Von Raab, where it stated that when the government seeks to prevent 
“highly dangerous conduct,” a lack of proof does not make the testing 
unwarranted.120 
It would seem that the integrity and judgment of an elected 
politician is at least as important as preventing a member of the high 
school band from being under the influence of drugs while performing 
the school’s alma mater.121  For example, Ohio Governors are entrusted 
and empowered to direct and coordinate all state law agency activity, 
call out the state militia, and appoint important commissioners and state 
 
 119. Earls III, 536 U.S. at 835 (stating how the Court has not required that a state demonstrate 
a particularized or pervasive drug problem before allowing the government to engage in 
suspicionless drug testing); Nat’l Treasury, 489 U.S. at 671-72 (holding suspicionless drug test of 
custom service agents applying for promotions was constitutional based in part on the compelling 
government interest in safeguarding the nation’s borders and keeping people who carry firearms off 
the influence of drugs); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628 (holding suspicionless drug testing of railroad 
workers was constitutional based on compelling government interest in having workers operating 
dangerous equipment free from influence of drugs in order to reduce risk of injuries to others). 
 120. Nat’l Treasury, 489 U.S. at 674-75 (stating “if the possible harm against which the 
government seeks to guard against is substantial, the need to prevent its occurrence furnishes ample 
justification for reasonable searches calculated to advance the government’s goal”).  See Michael A. 
Sprow, The High Price of Safety: May Public Schools Institute a Policy of Frisking Students as they 
Enter the Building?, 54 BAYLOR. L. REV. 133, 167-68 (2002) (discussing how according to the 
Supreme Court if the conduct trying to be deterred is highly dangerous, then a lack of proof of drug 
use among individuals to be tested does not make the testing policy unconstitutional); Parr, supra 
note 32, at 272 (discussing how the Court had sustained suspicionless drug testing policies in Nat’l 
Treasury and Skinner because of significant public safety concerns brought forth when customs 
officials or railroad workers are under the influence of drugs while performing their jobs); D. 
Garrison Hill, The Needle and the Damage Done: The Fourth Amendment, Substance Abuse and 
Drug Testing in the Public Sector, 8-JUN S.C. LAW. 19, 20 (1997) (discussing how Nat’l Treasury 
and Skinner have created a framework in which many state and federal courts have permitted 
suspicionless drug testing of numerous public employees regardless of their position of power). 
 121. Dery, supra note 102, at 93 (discussing how qualifications of political candidates, such as 
physical health, integrity, judgment, and perception are very important).  In comparison to Nat’l 
Treasury, it would seem these qualifications are at least as important, if not more important, than 
those of a custom service agent.  Id.  The Court was worried that custom service agents may be 
tempted by bribes or threatened by blackmail if they used drugs, but these same worries exist, 
arguably to a higher degree, for government officials.  Id..  See Walker Chandler and Miranda 
Doming-Krush, The Constitutional Validity of Suspicionless Drug Testing after Chandler v. Miller, 
28 STETSON L. REV. 737, 745 (1999) (discussing that the things that should disqualify people from 
public office are their ethics, morality, and integrity); Eric B. Post, Comment, Chandler v. Miller: 
Drug Testing Candidates for State Office Under the “Special Needs” Exception, 64 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1153, 1175 (1998) (discussing how there can be devastating results if powerful elected 
officials are drug abusers, so states should be able to take preventative measures before a drug 
abuser is elected). 
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board members.122  Consequently, a governor could make a flawed 
decision, injurious to a vast number of people, brought about by a lack 
of honesty or clear-sightedness resulting from drug use.123  Conversely, a 
tuba player in the band under the influence of drugs, in the worst-case 
scenario, might ruin a halftime show by tripping or blowing the wrong 
note.124  Apparently, in the Court’s subjective view, preventing band 
members from using drugs is more important than ensuring that the 
political leaders of our nation are drug-free.125 
 
 122. The Ohio Governor, Syllabus for PLS 323: Ohio Government, available at 
http://www.cola.wright.edu/courses/pls323/ohiogov.htm (last visited October 5, 2003) (discussing 
the State of Ohio’s Governor’s duties and responsibilities while in office).  See also Dery, supra 
note 102, at 96 (discussing generally how governors are empowered to call out the state militia, 
appoint administrators, respond to state emergencies, and direct law enforcement agencies, and as 
the highest of all state offices, governors should be held to the highest standards of honesty, 
integrity, and clear-thinking). 
 123. Dery, supra note 102, at 93-95 (discussing possible dangers that could arise if certain 
elected state officials are under the influence of drugs while carrying out their respective duties).  
The highest state judges rule on criminal cases, many times drug related cases, which will affect the 
determinations and future outcome of similar drug cases in lower courts.  Id. at 94.  It seems there is 
a serious danger in having judges make decisions without a clear state of mind, or impartial based 
on their own drug use.  Id.  Attorney generals have a duty to prosecute drug violators and are 
regularly exposed to large amounts of drugs.  Id. at 94.  If attorney generals are drug users they may 
have impartial judgment and could be persuaded by blackmail or bribery, and subsequently lose 
track of their duties to stop drug use.  Id.  Attorney generals or prosecutors are empowered with the 
decision of whether or not to prosecute and what charges to file, and this discretion should be 
exercised with the highest level of honesty and clear thinking.  Id. at 95.  But see Robert S. Logan, 
The Reverse Equal Protection Analysis: A New Methodology for “Special Needs” Cases, 68 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 447, 497 (2000) (discussing how there is no immediate or direct public harm that 
could result if political candidates used drugs). 
 124. See Earls III, 536 U.S. at 852 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing how the majority of 
Tecumseh students required to take a urinalysis are not engaged in the kinds of extracurricular 
activities that raise safety issues).  The only safety issues that can be dreamt up are “nightmarish 
images of colliding tubas, out-of control flatware, or livestock running amok.”  Id.  “Although one 
could imagine the havoc a drug-influenced tuba player might wreak on a halftime formation, 
realistically, no credible risk of injury exists.”  Messerle, supra note 11, at 837 (discussing how the 
decision in Vernonia should not be extended to include members of the band because there is a lack 
of potential harms which could ensue on band members performing while using drugs).  See 
Hutchens, supra note 35, at 1278 (discussing how it is difficult to imagine how participants in non-
athletic extracurricular activities such as choir or the academic team are in any physical danger if 
they compete in those activities while under the influence of drugs); Ralph D. Mawdsley & Charles 
J. Russo, Commentary, Random Drug Testing and Extracurricular Activities, 159 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 
11 (2002) (discussing the only consequences of members of the chess club being under the 
influence of drugs while playing chess is they may be humiliated by a bad chess move, but there is 
little chance of the student suffering any physical injury). 
 125. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321-22 (discussing how Georgia has failed to produce any 
evidence of a drug problem among it’s state elected officials, and therefore no special need exists).  
The court further discusses how political candidates do not perform high risk, safety sensitive tasks 
that would warrant a drug testing regime.  Id.  But see Earls III, 536 U.S. at 835 (stating that 
“viewing the evidence as a whole, it cannot be reasonably disputed that the [School District] was 
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C.  Diminished Expectations of Privacy Apply Equally 
In Earls the Court discounted the students’ reasonable expectation 
of privacy by stating that students participating in extracurricular 
activities have reason to expect intrusions upon their privacy because 
they are exposed to additional rules and regulations, similar to adults 
who chose to work in closely regulated industries.126  It seems absurd the 
Court failed to apply this same “diminished expectations of privacy” 
reasoning to political candidates in Chandler.127  Politicians’ everyday 
conduct is continuously under the public’s eye, and notably his or her 
personal life becomes fair game for television and the tabloids.128  Just as 
extracurricular activities have additional rules and regulations that 
diminish the students’ expectations of privacy, a candidate running for 
office exposes himself to the additional rules and regulations of 
 
faced with a ‘drug problem’ when it adopted the [drug testing] policy”).  The Court also stated that 
although testing of students in non-extracurricular activities doesn’t raise the same safety concerns 
as athletes on the football field, drug use in general carries a variety of health risks for students.  Id. 
at 836.  See also Parr supra note 32, at 260-61 (stating that apparently the Court believes that the 
nation is more interested in keeping children off drugs than political leaders who make important 
decisions); Post, supra note 121, at 260-61 (discussing how the drug problem is not limited to 
adolescents it has effected high public office as well, so the Supreme Court should allow testing). 
 126. Earls III, 536 U.S. at 832 (discussing the privacy interests of students choosing to 
participate in competitive extracurricular activities).  All of the extracurricular activities available to 
students have additional rules and regulations which further diminish the students’ expectations of 
privacy.  Id.  This diminished privacy is comparable to adults who choose to be employed in heavily 
regulated industries.  Id. 
 127. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319, 321-22 (discussing how Georgia had failed to show a special 
need for drug testing that was important enough to override the individual’s right to privacy under 
the Fourth Amendment).  Since there is no special need there was no reason to engage in a 
balancing of the parties individual privacy expectations and the government’s interest in conducting 
drug tests.  Id.  See Parr, supra note 32, at 260 (discussing how in past cases like Skinner and 
Vernonia, the Court held diminished expectations of privacy supported allowing suspicionless drug 
testing, but in Chandler the Court used this fact as a way to show no special need existed); Pring, 
supra note 112, at 435 (discussing how the Court used the heavy scrutiny politicians are faced with 
while in office not as a way to argue that politicians have a diminished expectation of privacy, but to 
say that no special need exists); Dery, supra note 102, at 100 (discussing how bizarre it is that the 
Supreme Court would not apply the same diminished expectations of privacy reasoning to politics).  
It would not have been a surprise at all if the Chandler Court used the special needs doctrine to state 
that since politicians voluntarily cast themselves into the public eye they have decreased their 
privacy expectations in regards to drug use.  Derry at 100. 
 128. Dery, supra note 102, at 100 (discussing how little expectations of privacy a politician can 
expect while they are in public office).  When a political candidate takes office his personal life 
becomes fair game for public scrutiny. Id.  It can be said that there are virtually no boundaries to the 
intrusions of privacy that a politician can expect while in office.  Id.  See Parr, supra note 32, at 260 
(discussing how politicians have diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their chosen 
occupation).  Candidates for political office are subject to “relentless scrutiny by their peers, the 
public, and the press.”  Id.  The day-to-day conduct of politicians running for a political office 
attracts attention beyond the “normal work environment.”  Id. 
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America’s tabloids and media frenzy.129  Just recently, President Bush’s 
routine physical examination, which included a colonoscopy, was 
legitimate news,130 and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott’s comments 
praising former Senator Strom Thurmond at his 100th birthday 
celebration were meticulously picked apart and criticized as supporting 
segregation.131  Thus, the Earls analysis concerning reasonable 
expectations of privacy, if consistently applied, would have most likely 
sustained the suspicionless drug testing of political candidates in 
Chandler.132 
 
 129. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (discussing how the Court 
has held different rules exist when a public figure, such as a politician, wants to sue an individual 
for defamation).  A public figure may hold a speaker liable for the damage to reputation caused by 
publication of a defamatory falsehood, but only if the statement was made “with knowledge that it 
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id.  See Monitor Patriot Co. v. 
Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 274 (1971) (stating that a candidate who vaunts his spotless record and sterling 
integrity cannot complain when an opponent or the media attempts to demonstrate the candidate is 
lying); But see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (stating if a newspaper or 
television station publishes defamatory statements about an individual who is neither a public 
official nor a public figure they may not claim constitutional privilege against liability for the injury 
inflicted).  When a student decides to go out for a high school sports team, she exposes herself to the 
atmosphere of a communal locker room.  Dery, supra note 102, at 100 (comparing situations which 
support why student athletes have diminished expectations of privacy to similar situations 
politicians face).  Similarly, a political candidate decides to join a state team by putting his name on 
the ballot, and exposes himself to the imaginary locker room of tabloids and television.  Id.  
Furthermore, just as railroad employees in Skinner submit to privacy invasions because they work in 
a highly regulated industry, politicians seeking public office submit to privacy intrusions by 
reporters and opponents because it is in the nature of their profession.  Id. 
 130. Tamara Lipper, Power: “President” Cheny?, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 2002, at 55 (discussing 
how President Bush recently had a colonoscopy done as a precautionary measure to ensure he does 
not have colon cancer); CNN.com/ inside politics, Bush to have colonoscopy under anesthesia, June 
28, 2002, available at http://www.cnn.com/ 2002/ALLPOLITICS/06/28/bush.tests/ (last visited 
October 5, 2003) (discussing how President Bush was going to Camp David to have a routine 
physical examination which included a colonoscopy).  “All in all, a colonoscopy is no big deal . . . 
except, it now seems, when the large intestine to be explored belongs to the current occupant of the 
White House.  Then, what is for everyone else little more than a pain in the ass is elevated to an 
event of constitutional moment.”  World Socialist Web Site, Why the big fuss over Bush’s 
colonoscopy?, July 2, 2002, available at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/jul2002/bush-j02.shtml 
(last visited October 5, 2003) (discussing how it should not be a big deal that President Bush is 
undergoing a colonoscopy). 
 131. Stephen F. Hayes, A Very Sorry Majority Leader, The Weekly Standard On-Line, 
December 23, 2002, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/ 
000/002/026qckpn.asp (last visited October 5, 2003) (discussing the comments made by Senator 
Trent Lott at Senator Strom Thurmond’s 100th birthday celebration).  During Lott’s praise of 
Thurmond for his long career in the Senate, Lott stated when Strom Thurmond ran for president his 
state voted for him and was proud of it.  Id.  Critics jumped all over the statement saying that when 
Thurmond ran for president he ran on a ballot that supported segregation.  Id.  Lott later apologized 
explaining his comments were not an endorsement of his positions of over 50 years ago, but of 
Thurmond and his remarkable life.  Id. 
 132. Dery, supra note 102, at 100 (discussing how it would not have been a surprise at all if the 
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D.  Earls Involves a Symbolic Need, Not a Special Need 
As stated earlier, the Supreme Court made clear that a drug testing 
policy established to set a good example or make a symbolic gesture to 
demonstrate a state’s commitment to the “war against drugs” is 
insufficient to relax Fourth Amendment guarantees.133  Since the 
Tecumseh school district was unable to present immediate or concrete 
evidence of drug abuse among the students to be tested,134 a strong 
argument can be made that the school district’s drug testing regime 
amounts to nothing more than a symbolic gesture to demonstrate a 
state’s commitment to the “war against drugs.”135  However, the Court 
 
Chandler Court used the special needs doctrine to state that since politicians voluntarily cast 
themselves into the public eye they have decreased their privacy expectations in regards to drug 
use); Parr, supra note 32, at 260 (discussing how the Court confused itself and past precedent by 
failing to use the reasoning in Vernonia [and Earls] when deciding Chandler, which could have 
been produced a different outcome in that case). 
 133. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321-22 (discussing how “symbolic” gestures, such as setting a good 
example or displaying a commitment to the fight against drug use, is not a special need and thus not 
enough to relax Fourth Amendment protections).  Actions such as setting a good example or making 
symbolic gestures do not reach the level of an important government need required to relax the 
constitutional guaranteed right to privacy.  Brewer, supra note 106, at 288-89 (quoting Justice 
Brandies by mentioning how “well meant symbolism is not sufficient reason to exempt a search 
from Fourth Amendment protection”).  See also Rebecca Claire Fischer, Current Development in 
the Law: Willis v. Anderson Comm. Sch. Corp., 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 395, 398 (1999) (discussing 
how the Seventh Circuit rejected a school’s policy for drug testing students who got into a fight at 
school because the suspicionless search was based on a symbolic purpose). 
 134. Earls III, 536 U.S. at 838 (stating how the Court only holds that the Tecumseh policy is a 
reasonable means of furthering the school district’s interest in keeping students off drugs, not that it 
is an effective means of deterring drug use among the specific students being tested).  Tecumseh’s 
drug testing policy falls short of deterring students who are in the most danger of using drugs.  Id. at 
853 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  See Dugan, supra note 111, at 180 (maintaining that the drug testing 
policy implemented in Earls does not put the focus where it needs to be—upon students who the 
school has “reasonable grounds to believe” are using drugs); Pring, supra note 112, at 482 (stating 
how the Tecumseh drug testing policy was not an effective deterrent because it tested students who 
did not have a history of a drug problem and who were not exposed to safety concerns associated 
with student drug use); Chotvacs, supra note 74, at 347 (mentioning if school districts do not have 
to demonstrate a perceivable problem before acting, their ability to invade upon the rights of 
students would be limitless); Book, supra note 31, at 650-54 (discussing how courts should use 
group suspicion but have to demonstrate an actual or imminent problem exists within group for the 
drug test to be constitutional).  But see Landreth, supra note 113, at 1267 (requiring a teacher or 
school official to formulate suspicion before implementing drug testing is problematic because they 
lack proper training). 
 135. Earls III, 536 U.S. at 854 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing how reviewing the 
Tecumseh drug testing policy and the facts presented should make the Supreme Court reach the 
conclusion that a symbolic need exists).  “What is left is the School District’s undoubted purpose to 
heighten awareness of its abhorrence of, and strong stand against, drug abuse.”  Id.  See Dugan, 
surpa note 112, at 171 (discussing that because the facts of Earls do not present a situation where 
students participating in extracurricular activities have drug problems, the need of the school 
amounts to a symbolic need similar to Chandler).  The language the Supreme Court used in 
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refused to apply its “symbolic” reasoning in Earls, stating essentially 
that a marijuana cigarette found close to the school ground by a drug dog 
was enough to “shore up” the special need for its drug testing 
program.136  If finding a marijuana cigarette near a school was enough to 
shore up a special need, maybe the Supreme Court is ready to say that 
finding the same near the Capitol or the Supreme Court building would 
be enough to shore up a drug testing program for our highest ranking 
officials; but do not count on it.137 
E.  Testing the Wrong Population 
The Supreme Court, although arguably upholding the Tecumseh 
policy for a symbolic purpose, targeted the wrong population when it 
approved suspicionless drug testing of students who participate in 
extracurricular activities.138  Evidence has shown a strong correlation 
 
Chandler seems equally as applicable to school districts who implement a suspicionless drug testing 
policy for extracurricular participants.  Id. at 180.  See also Craig M. Bradley, Court Gives School 
Drug-Testing an A, 38-DEC TRIAL 56, 57 (discussing how based on the facts of Earls, the drug 
testing policy presented could have been termed symbolic and not special); Veytsman, supra note 
23, at 327 (stating how drug testing policies focused on students involved in school activities are 
being adopted by school districts for the primary purpose of creating a “good image banner”).  But 
see Paul Goodwin, Student Drug Testing Since Vernonia: “Guidance Down the Slippery Slope”, 38 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 579, 613 (2002) (discussing how the Court should not require evidence of a 
specific drug problem among the students to be tested by a suspicionless drug testing policy because 
the school environment is very unique). 
 136. Earls III, 536 U.S. at 835 (discussing how the only evidence presented supporting that 
Tecumseh students use drugs was a drug dog finding a marijuana cigarette close to the school 
ground).  A demonstrated problem of drug abuse is not necessary to sustain a drug testing program, 
but there has to be some evidence to “shore up an assertion of special need for a suspicionless 
general search program.” Id.  The Tecumseh school district has provided sufficient evidence to 
shore up the need for its drug testing program.  Id. 
 137. Dery, supra note 102, at 103 (stating briefly that the reason for the Supreme Court’s 
inconsistencies in applying the special needs doctrine to drug testing policies aimed at government 
officials may be the result of the Justices themselves fearing they will be tested at some point).  
Subjecting political candidates to suspicionless drug testing, although similar to other cases, did not 
“sit well with the Justices—indeed it was a drug-testing case the Supreme Court did not like.”  
Bulthuis, supra note 74, at 1579 (implying the Justices may have had personal bias in deciding 
Chandler because it applied to drug testing officials in similar positions to themselves).  See Kitson, 
supra note 28, at 885 (discussing how Justice Scalia said that there is no better way to show that the 
government is serious about the “war on drugs” than to subject its own to the war by making them 
submit to tests). 
 138. Veytsman, supra note 23, at 324 (discussing how imposing drug testing of students 
involved in school extracurricular activities would be testing the students least likely to be using 
drugs); Raby, supra note 24, at 1033 (explaining how students involved in extracurricular activities 
are less likely than non-active students to engage in adolescent drug use); Glassman, supra note 50, 
at 981-82 (stating that a drug testing policy that only tests students who participate in extracurricular 
activities ignores drug use by the other groups of students who may be in the most need of school 
intervention).  A survey done in Indiana, which reported about drug use among students, concluded 
33
Kucharson: Please Report to the Principal's Office, Urine Trouble
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
KUCHARSON2.DOC 2/16/2004  11:02 AM 
164 AKRON LAW REVIEW [37:131 
between student participation in athletics and other extracurricular 
activities and reduction in drug use.139  As participation in school 
sponsored extracurricular activity increases, the likelihood of those 
participating students becoming drug users decreases.140  Following this 
logic, schools wishing to eradicate student drug use should focus on 
getting students involved in extracurriculars instead of providing them a 
reason not to participate.141  It is non-participating students who are truly 
the “at risk” students the government should be targeting, not the 
students already participating in extracurricular activities.142 
 
that many suspicionless drug testing policies are unlikely to deter drug use because they target the 
low risk students.  Bishop, supra note 50, at 241 (discussing how schools districts that implement 
suspicionless drug testing policies for students who voluntarily participate in extracurriculars will 
likely be testing the wrong population). 
 139. Bishop, supra note 50, at 242 (discussing a study done by the U.S. Department of Human 
and Health services regarding the correlation between extracurricular participation and drug use).  
The study clearly showed that students who get involved in school extracurricular activities were 
significantly less likely to exhibit risky behavior such as drug use and smoking.  Id.  See Raby, 
supra note 24, at 1033 (stating that scientific studies have demonstrated that students who isolate 
themselves from social activities are at a greater risk for drug abuse than students who are 
involved); Reginald G. Smart & Dianne Fejer, Recent Trends in Elicit Drug Use Among 
Adolescents, 68 CANADA’S MENTAL HEALTH SUPPLEMENT 12 (1971) (discussing how a study of 
close to 9,000 junior high and high school students revealed that students who didn’t participate in 
school activities were more likely to use drugs). 
 140. Earls III, 536 U.S. at 853 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing how “nationwide, students 
who participate in extracurricular activities are significantly less likely to develop substance abuse 
problems than are their less-involved peers”)  Tenth graders who stated they spent no time 
participating in school extracurricular activities were forty-nine percent more likely to have used 
drugs compared to students who spent one to four hours per week engaging in extracurricular 
activities.  Id.  See Bishop, supra note 50, at 241 (quoting a district judge who discussed how 
students participating in school extracurricular activities are less likely to use drugs and alcohol); 
Raby, supra note 24, at 1033 (discussing how participating in social activities has been proven to 
decrease the risk of student drug use); Veytsman, supra note 23, at 324-25 (stating that as a students 
get more involved in school activities, including participation in extracurricular activities, the 
likelihood of the student becoming a marijuana user decreases greatly); Harrison, supra note 44, at 
405 (discussing how students involved in competitive extracurricular activities use drugs less often 
because the fear drugs will have a negative effect on their performance). 
 141. Raby, supra note 24, at 1033 (discussing how the strong correlation between participation 
in extracurricular activity and decreased drug use suggests that school districts wanting to eliminate 
drug use among its students should encourage every student to get involved in school activities).  
Failure to do this by implementing suspicionless drug testing policies may “frustrate this goal.”  Id.  
By looking at studies done that show student participation in extracurricular activities decrease drug 
use, schools should be advised to encourage students to participate in extracurricular activities.  
Veytsman, supra note 23, at 324 (stating to discourage student drug use, schools need to be 
concerned with getting more of their students involved in school sponsored activities). 
 142. See supra notes 140-141 (discussing how students already involved in extracurricular 
activities are less likely to be using drugs than students not participating in extracurricular 
activities). 
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F.  Negative Consequences of Drug Testing Policies 
By handing students a cup to fill as a condition to participate in 
extracurriculars, students may simply chose not to participate as an 
alternative to undergoing a humiliating drug test.143  Proponents of 
suspicionless drug testing policies hope that the fear of random drug 
testing will coerce students to quit using drugs in order remain eligible to 
participate in their extracurricular activity.144  However, these same 
people fail to give consideration to the possibility students may chose 
the opposite.145  If students decide to forgo participation in 
extracurricular activities in preference to undergoing a urinalysis, it may 
generate numerous negative consequences.146  Students who are drug 
 
 143. Bishop, supra note 50, at 241 (discussing how students who are drug users and know they 
will have to undergo a urinalysis before they can participate in school extracurricular activities may 
simply chose not to participate); Dugan, supra  note 111, at 178 (discussing how students may be 
inclined to drop out of their extracurricular activity in order to avoid submitting to a drug test); 
Glassman, supra note 50, at 982-83 (discussing how drug testing policies may actually cause 
students to quit their activities); Dan Hardy, Athletes’ Drug Testing Has Been Quietly Dropped in 
Chester Upland, Phila., Inquirer, Oct. 11, 1998, at MD3 (discussing how a Pennsylvania school 
district implemented a drug testing program and students and parents blamed the lack of turnout for 
the football team to the drug testing policy).  Drug testing of students places extra burdens on 
participation and these extra burdens may lead marginal athletes and those interested in drugs to quit 
participation.  Raby, supra note 24, at 1033 (discussing there is a good chance that the threat of 
being drug tested may actually discourage some students from participating rather than deter the 
drug use); Veytsman, supra note 23, at 325-26 (discussing how educators are concerned that drug 
testing as a condition to participation in extracurricular activities may “dissuade” students from 
volunteering for school sponsored activities). 
 144. Dugan, supra note 111, at 178 (discussing how school districts assume that the drug 
testing policies they adopt will work because students value extracurricular activities over drug use).  
“The authors of suspicionless drug testing policies hope that the prospect of random testing will 
convince students to give up their drug habits in order to ensure their eligibility  for extracurricular 
activities.”  Id.  See McIntyre, supra note 31, at 1051 (discussing how the suspicionless drug testing 
policies adopted are scare tactics to intimidate students into compliance to reach the policies goals). 
 145. Dugan, supra note 111 at 178 (discussing how school districts are narrow sighted when 
they draft drug testing policies).  “School districts ought to take into account the likelihood that 
some students—perhaps because they are addicted, or perhaps because they value drugs above 
extracurriculars – either cannot or will not stop using drugs.”  Id.  See Wagman, supra note 7, at 358 
(discussing how it is unclear whether a suspicionless drug testing policy will “weed out abusers or 
make them think twice about participating in an extracurricular”); David Schimmel, Supreme Court 
Expands Random Drug Testing: Does the Fourth Amendment Still Protect Students?, 170 ED. LAW 
REP. 15, 22 (discussing an argument against suspicionless drug testing of students is that the testing 
will drive students away from extracurriculars that might help keep them off drugs and students will 
not participate because they feel their privacy is being invaded). 
 146. Bishop, supra note 50, at 241 (discussing that a major problem with drug testing policies 
aimed at students participating in extracurricular activities is that the policies do not logically lead to 
the outcome schools want to achieve); Dugan, supra note 111, at 177-79 (discussing the other 
arguments for striking down suspicionless drug testing of students besides Constitutional ones); 
Messerle, supra note 11, at 840-41 (discussing the possible dangerous results that may occur as side 
effects of suspicionless drug testing of students wishing to participate in extracurricular activities).  
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users or “at risk” students will be further removed from the positive 
support, guidance, and supervision available within the school 
environment.147  As a result, it becomes harder for school personnel to 
provide drug counseling or treatment, or even identify possible drug 
abuse problems.148  This being true, suspicionless drug testing policies 
could actually intensify an adolescent’s drug problems and make the 
habit more difficult for the student to overcome, which does not 
accomplish the purposes set out by the school.149 
Another potential side effect to suspicionless drug testing policies 
emerges from the policies blindness as to the time frame in which 
student drug use is most prevalent.150  If students opt to quit participating 
 
“Policies may actually discourage the student who is vulnerable to drug abuse from pursuing the 
structure and positive influence” of an extracurricular program.  Harrison, supra note 44, at 405 
(discussing drug testing policies will make some students hide their drug problems by avoiding 
participating in school extracurricular activities). 
 147. Bishop, supra note 50, at 240 (discussing how suspicionless drug testing policies may 
discourage students from participating which takes at risk students away from the protective school 
environment).  Suspicionless drug testing policies may have the effect of making students 
discontinue participating in extracurricular activities, which would remove students from the 
“positive support and guidance that his school has to offer.”  Dugan, supra note 111, at 178 
(discussing a possible negative consequence of suspicionless drug testing policies would be to take 
students out of a controlled school environment). 
 148. Martin H. Belsky, Random vs. Suspicion-Based Drug Testing in the Public Schools – A 
Surprising Civil Liberties Dilemma, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1, 19 (2002) (discussing how a good 
teacher or administrator could form some basis to believe a student has a drug problem based on 
interaction with the student under the teacher’s supervision).  Students who really need the help of 
drug counseling and rehabilitation would not be around school personnel who could monitor them 
and identify drug use problems so these students can get the appropriate help.  Bishop, supra note 
50, at 240-41 (discussing how it would become much more difficult for school faculty to help 
students if they are not participating in extracurriculars at the school).  Students who are “at risk” 
would not be under supervision longer than the standard school day, which may not be long enough 
for school personnel to notice the students’ drug problem.  Id. at 240.  It makes more sense to keep 
students with drug problems under school district control where there is school initiated counseling 
programs available.  Dugan, supra note 111, at 178 (discussing how when students do not 
participate in extracurricular activities it makes it much harder for school personnel to secure 
treatment options for students on drugs). 
 149. Dugan, supra note 111, at 179 (discussing how if students chose not to participate in 
extracurriculars the suspicionless drug testing policies may have the effect of increasing student 
drug problems).  If students are not participating and under supervision of the school, a student’s 
drug problem may be more difficult to overcome.  Id.  “As a result, there is an increased risk that 
students will choose drug use over participation in extracurricular activities, which arguably 
decrease drug use.  Glassman, supra note 50, at 983 (discussing how drug testing only certain 
groups of the student body may increase drug use because the students would quit the activity that 
subjects them to the drug test). 
 150. Bishop, supra note 50, at 242 (discussing the peak times in which students would engage 
in juvenile crimes are between three o’clock and eight o’clock).  This time frame represents the time 
separating when students get out of school and their parents arrive home.  Id.  See Dugan, supra 
note 111, at 179 (stating a major problem with many drug testing regimes are their narrow focus and 
not looking at the potential side effects such as what students will do with their extra free time if 
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in extracurricular activities as an alternative to being tested, the drug 
testing policies adopted by schools would in essence be creating more 
free time for students to use drugs.151  The time frame in which students 
would normally be engaging in productive extracurricular activity, such 
as football, band, or cheerleading, transforms into unsupervised time in 
an empty house where the effects of peer pressure can dominate a child’s 
decisions.152  Keeping students involved in constructive extracurricular 
activities that may reveal an undiscovered talent or passion seems like 
much better public policy than leaving students in unsupervised homes 
with hours of free time to be tempted by curiosity.153 
Finally, the authors of suspicionless drug testing policies and the 
 
they chose not to participate in extracurriculars). 
 151. Bishop, supra note 50, at 242 (discussing the free time students would acquire by 
choosing not to participate in extracurriculars would be time they are most likely to get into trouble 
or use drugs).  “If students are given enjoyable activities in which they can truly excel and become 
constructively involved, then there is less time for them to get into trouble with illegal substances, 
get involved with others spending their time dealing in illegal substances, or even become involved 
in crimes.”  Id.  The peak times in which students would engage in juvenile crimes are between 
three o’clock and eight o’clock.  Id.  This time frame represents the time separating when students 
get out of school and their parents arrive home.  Id.  See Dugan, supra note 111, at 179 (discussing 
an important effect of suspicionless drug testing may be to free up time for students to engage in 
drugs after school during the hours which they might otherwise be involved in extracurricular 
activities). 
 152. Bishop, supra note 50, at 242 (discussing how if students are not participating in 
extracurricular activities after school they will be faced with the temptation to do illegal activities).  
Extracurricular activities are major ways to keep students from going home to empty houses where 
they are unsupervised and can get into trouble.  Id.  See Elizabeth Garfinkle, Coming of Age in 
America: The Misapplication of Sex-Offender Registration and Community-Notification Laws to 
Juveniles: 91 CAL. L. REV. 163, 193 (2003) (discussing how adolescents are more likely to engage 
in all criminal activity when they are in groups and the acts adolescents participate in often related 
to peer pressure and trying to impress one’s friends); Andrew D. Leipold, The War on Drugs and 
the Puzzle of Deterrence, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 111, 117 (2002) (discussing how the greatest 
reason most teenagers report they use or have experimented with drugs is peer pressure from their 
friends).  But, students could rely on the threat of being selected for the suspicionless drug testing as 
an excuse when telling their peers they do not want to participate in drug use.  Raby, supra note 24, 
at 1032 (discussing how drug testing policies adopted by school districts could serve as a weapon 
for students to use to fight off peer pressure).  See Sandy Louey, Schools Considering Drug-Testing 
Program, Trustees may get Recommendation this Spring, The Dallas Morning News, Jan. 21, 1999, 
at 1G (stating that drug testing can give students a good reason to refuse drugs and escape peer 
pressure from other students). 
 153. Bishop, supra note 50, at 242-43 (discussing a better public policy would be keep students 
occupied in constructive extracurricular activities rather than putting them in a position to be 
tempted by illegal activity).  “After all, barring a student from participating in an activity that could 
reveal an undiscovered talent or passion, or which may provide a glimpse of opportunities available 
to the student besides drug use, hardly seems like good public policy.”  Dugan, supra note 111, at 
179 (discussing that public policy would be better served if schools made every effort to get 
students involved in extracurricular activities instead of excluding students from the activities and 
creating more time for students to use drugs after school). 
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Supreme Court underestimate the value of school related extracurricular 
activities by maintaining the position that extracurricular activities are 
simply a privilege and not an integral part of a student’s educational 
experience.154  By maintaining this position, primary and secondary 
educational institutions lose focus of their main obligation to students – 
to make sure students are prepared for the real world.155  Arguably a 
student’s future success and livelihood can be equally attributed to what 
is learned and achieved through extracurricular activities as well as what 
is learned in the classroom.156  Participation in school extracurricular 
 
 154. See Earls III, 536 U.S. at 825 (suggesting that any extracurricular students engage in high 
school is purely a privilege because the students voluntarily participate in them); Badanes, supra 
note 26, at 718 (discussing how there is a strong argument that extracurricular activities are not 
really a voluntary privilege).  Justice Ginsburg recognized in her dissent in Earls that a student’s 
participation in extracurricular activities is “part of a complete educational experience.”  Earls III, 
536 U.S. at 845-46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  But see Mawdsley, supra note 124, at 9 (stating that 
courts continue to treat extracurricular activities as a privilege despite the recognized educational 
benefits associated with extracurricular activities). 
 155. See Todd v. Rush County Sch., 139 F.3d 571, 573 (7th Cir. 1998) (Ripple, J., dissenting) 
(discussing how “exclusion of a high school student from all extracurricular activities deprives that 
student of a great deal of what the modern American high school has to offer in terms of academic 
and personal development.”).  The success of teachers being able to educate depends on whether the 
student trusts the teacher, which may not happen if that teacher is the one monitoring the student’s 
suspicionless drug test.  Dupre, supra note 36, at 100 (stating that “teachers are in school to 
educate” students).  “Perhaps the real problem is merely that schools have lost focus on their 
primary goal: to educate young people in a discrete set of skills in preparation for adulthood.”  
Eskelsen, supra note 37, at 363 (discussing the argument that schools need to shift their focus).  
Teachers must examine whether their purpose is to clean up societies problems or prepare students.  
Kitson, supra note 28, at 882 (discussing how high schools would be more effective if they used 
their sparse educational resources to further educational goals and not on drug testing).  “School 
administrators’ time and efforts would be better spent maintaining their successful educational 
efforts to discourage drug use, rather than shadowboxing against problems that may not exist.”  
McIntyre, supra note 31, at 1051 (discussing how school administrators are not spending their time 
and efforts correctly to ensure students are law abiding citizens when they leave); Jamie Parslow, 
4th Amendment & Searches in Schools, 28-JUN VT. B.J. 68, 68 (2002) (stating how an adolescents 
high school years are the years that teach students to grow and prepare to be the future leaders and 
employers of the world).  See University Interscholastic League, Benefits of Extracurricular 
Activities, available at http://uil.utexas.edu/admin/benefits.html (last visited October 5, 2003) 
(discussing how extracurricular activities teach students valuable qualities that the public expect 
high schools to produce in the students so the students become responsible adults). 
 156. Mawdsley, supra note 124, at 9 (discussing how extracurricular activities can play an 
important role in deciding how a student’s future turns out economically).  “In a changing society 
where a student’s future livelihood may just as well reflect what is learned in extracurricular 
activities as in the classroom.”  Id.  Participation in extracurricular activities is important to a 
student’s development educationally and economically in the future.  Id.  See University 
Interscholastic League, supra note 155 (discussing how participation in extracurricular activities is a 
great predictor of whether the student will have later success in life).  Studies done show that the 
only factor that could be used to predict a student’s later success in life was whether the student 
achieved in school extracurricular activities.  Id.  Extracurricular activities are valuable because they 
reinforce skills the student learns in the classroom and gives the student an opportunity to apply 
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activities can play an integral role in developing the character traits that 
may dominate a student’s personality the rest of his or her life.157  If 
students elect not to participate as an alternative to undergoing an 
invasive drug test, they may never learn the value of teamwork, 
importance of responsibility, or rewards of hard work and dedication.158  
This being so, primary and secondary educational institutions will fail in 
accomplishing their primary task by not preparing drug free students, a 
consequence far worse than allowing a few members of the band, an 
extracurricular group that has no demonstrated proclivity towards drug 
use, play their school’s fight song under the influence.159 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court once said that students do not “shed their 
constitutional rights . . . at the school-house gate,”160 but after the Earls 
decision one would not be too far off the mark to say that the rights of 
students are now shredded when they walk through the schoolhouse 
gates.161  The disparate treatment of schoolchildren and politicians 
illustrates that the special needs doctrine can be manipulated to meet 
 
things learned in the classroom to a real-life situation.  Id. 
 157. Lani Guinier, Reframing the Affirmative Action Debate, 86 KY. L.J. 505, 518 n.29 (1998) 
(stating how intense extracurricular involvement in high school reflects qualities of student 
leadership as well as initiative); Peter Sansom and Frank Kemerer, It’s All About Rules, 166 ED. 
LAW REP. 395, 396 n.4 (stating that students who participate in athletics and extracurricular 
activities are likely to overcome biases based on race, cultural, and socioeconomic status); 
McIntyre, supra note 31, at 1048 (discussing how the values students learn in grade school and high 
school are ones the students will take with them the rest of their lives). 
 158. Nemours Foundation, Extracurricular Excitement, available at http://kidshealth.org/ 
teen/school_jobs/ school/involved_school.html (last visited October 5, 2003) (discussing how 
participating in school extracurricular activities helps students become well-rounded and 
responsible).  See University Interscholastic League, supra note 155 (discussing how extracurricular 
activities provide valuable lessons to students such as teamwork, sportsmanship, and hard work).  
Extracurricular activities also help students develop self discipline.  Id.  Studies have shown that 
ninety-five percent (95%) of students and principals feel that participation in extracurricular 
activities teach students valuable lessons that cannot be learned in the classroom.  Id. 
 159. Wagman, supra note 7, at 358 (discussing how in reality the suspicionless drug testing 
policies adopted by schools infringe upon the constitutional rights of all students being tested to 
detect just a few students who do use drugs); University Interscholastic League, supra note 155 
(discussing how extracurricular activities teach students valuable qualities that the public expect 
high schools to produce in the students so the students become responsible adults). 
 160. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (stating that even 
though students do not “shed their constitutional rights. . . at the school house gate,” the extent of 
their rights is only what is appropriate for children at school). 
 161. Schimmel, supra note 145, at 21 (discussing how in Professor Herman Schwartz’s 
opinion, the decision in Earls means the “rights of young people are shredded when they walk 
through the school-house gates”). 
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whatever end the Court subjectively feels is the best outcome.162  
Recognizing that the special need doctrine has no anchor in the Fourth 
Amendment and serves as a string-puppet for the Court’s shifting values 
should raise serious concerns about the implications of the Earls 
decision.  It is not inconceivable that Earls will lead to an avalanche of 
suspicionless testing policies not based on evidence of drug use or other 
concrete evidence, but based on amorphous principles of ensuring 
student health and well being.163 
The national crisis America is facing regarding adolescent drug use 
is by no means a problem that can be ignored.164  It is indisputable that 
the government has an extremely important interest in keeping our 
students drug free.165  However, analyzing the possible negative 
ramifications that flow from suspicionless drug testing policies, like the 
one adopted in Earls, demonstrate that this interest should not be 
absolute.166  The Courts must never forget: “the greatest dangers to 
liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning 
but without understanding.”167 
M. Casey Kucharson 
 
 162. See supra notes 117-18 (discussing how the special needs doctrine amounts to nothing 
more than a balancing test susceptible to the Supreme Court’s shifting values). 
 163. Hutchens, supra note 35, at 1286 (discussing what other kinds of searches may survive 
constitutional scrutiny under the rationale of insuring student health and safety).  Since sexually 
transmitted diseases, like drugs, represent a serious threat to the safety of students, a school may be 
able to initiate suspicionless testing of students for sexually transmitted diseases.  Id.  See 
Schimmel, supra note 145, at 24 (discussing how based on the rationale of Earls it may be 
constitutional for schools to require students who drive to school to be subject to random 
suspicionless drug testing); Raby, supra note 24, at 1023-24, 1027-28 (discussing how testing only 
certain groups of students is just a screen for testing virtually the entire student body, and if the 
government’s objective is to deter drug use among students, courts could logically extend testing to 
entire student population). 
 164. Glassman, supra note 50, at 981; McIntyre, supra note 31, at 1028-29. 
 165. McIntyre, supra note 31, at 1028-29, 1038. 
 166. See supra notes 143-55 (discussing negative consequences of suspicionless drug testing). 
 167. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 573 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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